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Abstract 
Contextual factors are typically neglected in both theorizing and empirical tests on 
executive pay. The fast majority of empirical investigations use data from U.S. based 
firms. Theoretical implications are typically developed, understood and tested on the 
basis of the U.S. context. However, the U.S. case is not the world wide standard. Pay 
in other countries is on average considerably lower and have a different pay mix. The 
puzzle that from the typical use of agency theory can’t be explained is the variance of 
pay practices that exist not only within countries but also across countries. This paper 
extends scholars renewed attention to managerial power theory on executive pay. It 
sets out how and why institutional theory must be included in explanations of 
executive pay.  On the basis of a sample of executive pay packages from 17 different 
countries we test the theoretical extensions. Results indicate that institutions interact 
with firm level determinants of executive pay. Explanations for executive pay should 
therefore account for the variance of pay practices within and across countries. 
Highlighting that the institutional embeddedness of pay practices play an important 
role in finding conclusive explanations of current pay practices.       
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1. Introduction  
Executive pay levels and structures differ greatly within and across national 
contexts (Abowd and Bognanno, 1995; Conyon and Murphy 2000; Kaplan, 1994; 
Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004; Zhou, 1999). These differences seem to remain over time 
and seem to still exist after controlling for known firm-level indicators of executive 
pay, such as firm size, performance, and executives’ human capital (cf. Abowd and 
Bognanno, 1995; Conyon and Murphy 2000; Tosi et al, 2000). Apparently, to 
understand the drivers of executive pay across national settings, the need exists to cast 
our theoretical nets wider than most received accounts of executive pay so far have 
suggested. The research presented in this paper therefore shifts the attention away 
from the traditional principal-agency explanation of pay (cf. Hall and Liebman, 1998; 
Hall and Murphy, 2003; Jensen and Murphy 1990b; Murphy, 1999, 2002), in which 
executive pay is more considered as a tool within an arm’s length contracting process 
between a company’s professional managers and the designated representatives of its 
owners in the form of either the board of directors as a whole or its remuneration 
committee.  
In its place, an account based on managerial power theory is put forward. As has 
been proposed by others, and seems to be heading to a recently achieved consensus in 
the literature, executive pay should be more considered as an outcome of pay setting 
processes that are mediated by the level of discretion of the actors involved (Cf. 
Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; 2006; Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002; Bebchuk and 
Grinstein, 2005; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Finkelstein and Boyd 1998, 
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002; Hallock, 
1997; Jensen and Murphy, 2004; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Useem, 1996; 
Westphal and Zajac, 1995). Managerial power theory suggest, if we want to 
understand how executive pay levels and structures come about, we should look 
beyond the stylized accounts provided by the economic models of considering 
executive pay as a tool to align the interests between firm owners and executives. To 
understand the processes of setting pay we rather should turn our attention to the 
actual conditions under which pay is set. These conditions are unpacked in two steps.  
First, conventional managerial power theory is followed to predict that certain 
company-level corporate governance features give CEOs and other executives 
considerable discretion over the pay setting process, such that they can bend it in their 
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favor of relative less pay at risk and extract greater pay from the corporations they 
lead. Specifically, the focus is on five executive-empowering/limiting corporate 
governance features, notably: CEO/Chair duality, single-tiered boards, the proportion 
of executives over non-executives on a board, employee representation on boards, and 
the number of non-executives on a board. Since conventional managerial theory has 
thus far mainly been tested in the US, the first research question addressed is whether 
its predictions can be generalized across a considerably broader cross-national sample. 
Second, efforts are made to extend the theory by hypothesizing how certain 
features of the institutional environment in which the firm is incorporated can further 
increase (or decrease) executives’ discretion over the pay setting process. Relevant 
influences on executives’ control over pay setting processes emanate from the legal 
(La Porta et al., 1997), political (Roe, 2003), economic (Rajan and Zingales, 2003), 
and social environments such as cultural (Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004), as well as 
from the news media (Core, Guay, and Larcker, 2005; Dyck and Zingales, 2002, 
2004). In order to test the second research question, which is to what extent 
managerial discretion over the pay setting process is contingent upon forces 
emanating from national institutional contexts, a broad range of these institutional 
indicators are taken into account.  
 
The theoretical intuitions concerning the role of managerial power in the pay 
setting process are tested on a primary data set of 3880 pay levels and 1195 pay 
structures representing 940 firm-year observations from 17 countries. Results indicate 
that a significant portion of the within-country variance in executive pay levels and 
structures is indeed explained by structural corporate governance characteristics that 
give executives more or less discretion over the pay setting process. These results 
confirm earlier studies by Bebchuk and Fried and others, but are however for the first 
time tested on a cross-national dataset that allows to simultaneously analyze within- 
and between-country variance of pay arrangements. Furthermore, the results also 
indicate that firm-level corporate governance antecedents interact with the 
institutional contexts in which these arrangements are embedded. Cross-national 
differences in executive pay levels and structures thus seem to derive at least in part 
from a combination of firm- and country level factors which allow executives to exert 
discretion over the process by which their pay is set. These results remain intact when 
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controlled for relevant other firm-level variables like size and performance as well as 
country-level variables like per capita income and personal and corporate tax levels.  
Although the results indicate that managerial power theory can be generalized 
across institutional contexts, predictions, conclusions and policy implications based 
on the theory are however highly reliant on contextual conditions. This does not 
disconfirm the theory, but merely shows that when applying the theory it needs 
extensions to be able to make predictions powerful enough to deal with these highly 
important contextual conditions.    
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, before hypothesizing standard managerial 
power theory to answer the question whether managerial power theory predictions can 
be generalized across a considerably broader cross-national sample, both the complete 
contracting as well as the managerial power theory are discussed (dealt with in section 
3.2: Theory and hypotheses; step 1). After this and after the first set of hypotheses 
related to the first research question, the managerial power approach is subject of 
further discussion and hypothesizes are made concerning the predictions of the theory 
when extending it to an institutional context (dealt with in section 3.3 Theory 
extensions and hypotheses; step 2). After these two steps, the succeeding section 
discusses the dataset used to empirically test the hypotheses, followed by the results 
of the analyses. The subsequent sections conclude and provide some implications of 
the results for theory development as well as for practice.      
 
2 Theory and hypotheses; step 1 
Within this first step, the basics of “the official story” (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) 
on executive pay are discussed first. This dominant approach in the literature is based 
on an agency framework and relies on optimal contract views and considers pay as a 
tool. Pay is considered as a tool coming with certain costs, as reflected by the needed 
incentives (i.e. pay) to transfer risks of possible deviations from the principals’ 
interests to the agent. Managerial power theory, which is discussed next, resembles 
the optimal contract approach rather closely. Except, managerial power theory 
considers the discretion pay setters and pay receivers have not merely as a cost but as 
real possible behavior (Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002). It does not 
exclusively see pay arrangements as a purpose to alleviate agency problems but more 
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as an outcome of pay setting processes. After the discussion of the basic premises of 
the two theories, a first set of hypotheses is formulated.    
  
2.1 Optimal contracting theory 
How does executive pay get determined? In the stylized world of principal-agency 
theory, the answer is through arm’s length contracting. In the traditional setup, the 
owners of a firm delegate the authority to make day-to-day operating decisions and set 
long-term corporate policy to a set of competent professional managers (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). One motivation for doing so is that many shareholders lack the 
expertise to run the firms they own. Another reason, rooted in optimal portfolio theory 
(Fama, 1980), is that shareholders also lack the incentive to lead firms, as their 
investments are spread across many businesses in order to minimize risk. But since 
shareholders are imperfect readers of managers’ minds as they are hampered by 
incomplete information of managerial behaviors, it would be unwise for them to hand 
over all residual control rights to managers. Shareholders have therefore traditionally 
delegated the rights to hire, fire, and set compensation policy for executives to a 
separate supervisor in the form of the corporate board or the board’s remuneration 
committee (Conyon and He, 2004). These latter bodies are supposed to act in the sole 
interest of shareholders. 
The board or compensation committee will then engage in arm’s length 
contracting with executives, in order to produce an implicit or explicit employment 
contract (Gillan, Hartzell, and Parrino, 2005). Executive employment contracts 
typically have a fixed duration, and stipulate terms of employment like salary, bonus, 
and other incentives, as well as perquisites like pension advice, country club 
membership, and use of the corporate jet (Rajan and Wulf, 2004; Schwab and 
Thomas, 2004; Yermack, 2005). The supervisor’s responsibility is to write the best 
possible contract as seen from the perspective of shareholders – one that “maximizes 
the net expected economic value to shareholders after transaction costs (such as 
contracting costs) and payments to employees. An equivalent way of saying this is 
that [optimal] contracts minimize agency costs” (Core, Guay, and Larcker, 2003).  
Assumed is that writing good contracts are hampered by myopia problems. 
Specifically, executives are motivated to advance their own interests after they are 
hired than those of the shareholders they are supposed to serve (Jensen and Meckling, 
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1976). Intelligent supervisors will therefore make use of outcome based contracts 
serving as incentives which’ value is contingent on performance, such as bonuses, 
stock options, restricted stock, and long-term contracts (Conyon, 2006). If all goes 
well, such performance-contingent arrangements will motivate executives to work on 
shareholders’ behalf, as the outcome based contract transfers risks of deviation from 
not adhering to the incentives will diminishes the risk-averse self serving executive’s 
wealth. The actual level of pay is based on the market value for which executives with 
applicable capabilities are willing to take the risk of contracting themselves to a 
specific firm (cf. Jensen and Murphy, 1990b).  In sum, the arm’s length view of the 
pay setting process is “neat, tractable, and reassuring” (Bebchuk and Fried, 2006: 12). 
 
2.2 Managerial Power Theory 
The problem with optimal contracting theory is that it hinges on two crucial 
assumptions. First, by presuming that misalignment of interests between pay setters 
and receivers are merely a cost and not considered as real possible behavior (Grabke-
Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002), the theory does assume that executives are not able 
to use their self serving behavior in the contracting process it self. In other words, as 
argued by Bebchuck and Fried (2002) and Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (2002), if a-
priory executives are expected to make non-shareholder value maximizing decisions, 
the reason of the outcome based contract in the first place, there is no reason to a-
priory assume that executives make shareholder value maximization choices at all. 
Setting executive pay is thus an agency problem in it self as the solution to the 
problem can not be part of the same problem, and thus setting pay is not a perfect 
mean to an end of alleviating agency problems (Bebchuck and Fried 2002 Bebchuk, 
Fried and Walker 2002).  
Second, it presumes that even though managers are self-serving and thus 
constantly are on the look-out for ways to extract rents for personal gains, board 
members (i.e. non-executives) are presumed to be altruistic doves who always 
faithfully serve shareholders’ interests. Managerial power theory differs from optimal 
contracting theory in that it also challenges this assumption. As Bebchuk and Fried 
(2003, 2004, 2006) and others have argued, there are no good reasons to believe that 
directors will automatically do everything in their power to serve the interests of 
shareholders. In fact, a more tenable position appears to be that directors’ willingness 
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to serve is contingent on whether their interests are more tightly linked with those of 
shareholders or management (Conyon and Ye, 2004). There are numerous good 
reasons for assuming that self-interested directors will in many cases side with the 
latter. 
First, directors may collude with managers in order to get reelected. The nominal 
right to reelect directors may rest with shareholders, but in practice many of the 
director slates offered at annual meetings are the ones proposed by management 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2006). Secondly, directors may adopt a generous attitude 
towards executives in the hope of receiving higher pay themselves. Prior empirical 
studies have shown that in companies with higher CEO compensation, directors get 
paid more too (Brick, Palmon, and Wald, 2006). Third, board members may not care 
about the economic consequences of high pay. Directors typically own only a small 
fraction of the firm’s shares, such that the economic cost of even excessive 
compensation can be quite low to them (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Fourth, board 
members may simply be generous to the CEO because they are on a friendly bases 
(Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, Daltan, 1998). Evidence pointing in this direction of 
cronyism furthermore exists in the form of studies showing that remuneration 
committees whose chairs have been installed later than the CEO was hired tend to pay 
more than those for which this order is reversed (Main, O’Reilly, and Wade, 1995). 
Needless to say, examples of how executives can use their discretion and how 
directors can collude with them are plenty full. Rather than elaborating on more 
examples and dwell on conceptual concerns, the present paper will focus on the pay 
setting process of executives, and not on the pay setting process of non-executives. 
The process of setting pay for non-executives and further investigating how their 
discretion effects their pay and the pay of executives is left for future research. 
Potentially, a similar approached as pursued here could provide more insights in non-
executive discretion. The general issue under investigation is: which conditions 
mediate the discretion between pay setters (i.e. non-executives) and pay receivers (i.e. 
executives) in the pay setting process of executives? Like many others have already 
opted (e.g. Boyd, 1994; Conyon and Peck, 1998), possible answers must be sought in 
the area of governance as weak governance in particular empowers executives and 
possibly especially CEOs vis-à-vis non-executives. For sure, there is no lack of firm-
level corporate governance mechanisms that were designed with the intention of 
limiting executives’ power over boards. But the diffusion of these mechanisms should 
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not be taken-for-granted, and even within one and the same jurisdictions the adoption 
of governance provisions can differ from company to company (Tosi and Gomez-
Mejia, 1989).  
 
2.3 Managerial Power Theory: Firm-level Hypotheses 
This section formulates a number of hypotheses, consistent with received 
managerial power theory, on the influence of possible executive discretion over pay 
levels and structures. The underlying logic behind the formulated hypotheses is rather 
straight forward. More discretion of the executives is expected to lead to higher pay 
levels, and to lower pay at risk. More discretion is expected to lead to higher pay as it 
provides the executives with more leverage to serve their own interests of higher 
levels of wealth. More discretion is expected to lead to lower pay at risk, i.e. in theory 
less performance contingent pay, as the executives are assumed to be risk averse and 
will thus negotiate higher fixed components as a proportion of total pay  (i.e. higher 
salary as a proportion of total pay).    
 
2.3.1 CEO/Chair duality 
The first considered governance provision that is known to weaken non-
executives vis-à-vis executives is CEO/Chair duality; a situation in which both 
functions of Chairman of the board and Chief Executive Officer are joined in the 
hands of a single person (Boyd, 1994; 1995; Fama and Jensen, 1983). CEO duality 
plays two complementary roles in managerial power theory. First, it typically 
increases the CEO’s discretionary powers over firm resources and is thereby taken by 
inside and outside stakeholders to reflect strong leadership (cf. Finkelstein and 
D’Aveni, 1994). As a significant and visible symbol, duality reinforces the CEO’s 
“figurehead status” (Ungson and Steers, 1984). The figurehead CEO/Chair tends to 
present him- or herself as the ulterior representative of the corporation, and typically 
seeks to underwrite this status and mandate with higher than average pay (Gomez-
Mejia, 1994). Second, in a situation of duality, the CEO, as leader of his fellow 
collaborating executives, is also the leader of the board, and can therefore command 
additional obedience and loyalty on behalf of those entities that are put in place to set 
executive pay (cf. Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Duality therefore offers executives with 
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opportunities for increasing pay levels and bending pay structures to make them in 
theory less reliant on performance, i.e. to raise the proportion of executive fixed salary 
components over total pay. Formally stated as: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Executive pay levels will be higher in firms where there is 
CEO/Chair duality.  
Hypothesis 1b: The salary component of executive’s pay will be larger in firms 
where there is CEO/Chair duality. 
 
2.3.2 One-tier boards  
Companies are either governed by a one-tiered or a two-tiered board. One-tier 
boards are composed of both executive and non-executive members, and may be 
chaired by a representative of either group. Typical for the single tier situation, and 
important for managerial power theory, is that the non-executives do not meet 
independently of the executives, such that even the non-executive members of the 
board are never completely out of the CEO’s and other executives’ sphere of 
influence (cf. Conyon and Peck, 1998). Two-tier boards, in contrast, have a first tier in 
the form of a supervisory body composed exclusively of non-executive directors. The 
supervisory board mostly “appoints the members of the management board [i.e., the 
second tier], equivalent to the executive directors of a U.K. or U.S. [single tier] board, 
approves the annual accounts and the firm’s long-term strategy, and can intervene 
when there is a serious deterioration in the company’s fortunes” (Franks and Mayer, 
2001: 952). Of special interest to managerial power theory is that even though the 
CEO is typically chair of the management board, the CEO and his fellow executives 
are not a member of the supervisory board and do not normally attend their meetings. 
One-tier boards thus offer executives greater opportunities for persuading non-
executives to go along with higher salary levels and with less pay that is contingent on 
performance. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Executive pay levels will be higher in firms with a one-tier board 
structure.  
Hypothesis 2b: The salary component of the executive pay will be higher in 
firms with a one-tier board structure. 
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2.3.3 Employee board representation 
The third set of 2 hypotheses concerns the representation of employees on the 
board, a governance mechanism that shows firms’ commitment to human capital and 
willingness to let lower level employees “codetermine” the fate of the organization. 
Employee board representation plays at least four constraining roles in limiting 
executive discretion. First, since employee representatives are not usually drawn from 
the inner circles of the corporate elite, certain social control processes that give 
executives greater influence over fellow elite members (such as long-standing 
friendships and the “shadow of the future” (Axelrod, 1984) imposed by external 
business ties and protection of the managerial class (Gomez-Mejia, 1994)) are 
rendered ineffective. Thus, employee representatives are in this sense less likely to be 
co-opted by management than other directors. Second, with employee representatives 
firms allow a third residual claimant (in addition to management and shareholders) 
into the boardroom (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003), thus potentially lowering 
management’s “piece of the pie” and discretion over firm resources. Third, employees 
are more likely than other directors to have a keen eye for the proportionality between 
executive compensation and their own pay, and to object when the differences 
become socially unacceptable (cf. Simon, 1957). Fourth, due to their day-to-day 
relationships with management, employee representatives are in better positions than 
most directors to directly oversee executives’ actions (Dow 2003, Hansmann, 1996). 
Employee representations on the board thus result in lower managerial discretion, 
leading to the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Executive pay levels will be lower in firms with employee 
representation on the board.  
Hypothesis 3b: The salary component of executive pay will be lower in firms 
with employee representation on the board. 
 
2.3.4 Number of non-executives 
One governance characteristic that is often explored in terms of its implications 
for management monitoring is board size (Boyd, 1994; 1995). Here, in order to make 
 12
the results comparable across the 17 countries in the sample, the number of non-
executives on a one-tier board and the number of people on the supervisory board on a 
two-tier board represent the potential number of directors that monitor executives.  
Applying managerial power theory as addressed, would suggest that more non-
executives leads to more monitoring and thus leave less discretion to executives. An 
additional counter explanation that is given within managerial power theory is that 
greater absolute numbers of the supervisors on a board could reduce the effectiveness 
of board monitoring and increase executive entrenchment due to problems of 
collective action (Conyon and Peck, 1998; Yermack, 1996). This effect, often tested 
on US and UK data where it is likely to be stronger due to the lesser independence of 
boards from management as they are one-tier board structures (Gedajlovic and 
Shapiro, 1998), is found to support the view that bigger boards tend to pay more 
(Core, Halthausen and Larcker, 1999) and could be interpreted that bigger boards 
leave executives with more discretion.  
On the other hand, Yermack (1996) found that smaller boards often tend to rely 
more heavily on incentive pay, possibly in order to compensate for their lack of 
monitoring ability (cf. Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994), suggesting that bigger boards 
are better able to constrain executives discretion. Thereby, bigger boards may want to 
avoid “overt monitoring” by providing too much incentives (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 
1994). The arguments indicate that executive discretion under conditions of bigger 
board size could thus go either way and still fit more or less within a managerial 
power view. It could be that interpretations of theoretical concepts as overt monitoring 
and problems of collective action could be biased by generalizing the empirical results 
based on single country data that reflect only one-tier board structures. Interpreting 
previous results could thus be biased by generalizing these results from these “special 
cases” of one-tier board structures. Since managerial power theory is here for the first 
time subject of a cross-national sample, comprised of both two-tier and one-tier board 
structures, “standard” managerial power theory is followed. The expectation is that 
more non-executive are, at least potentially, better in constraining executive 
discretion. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 4a: Executive pay levels will decrease with the number of non-
executives on the board.  
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Hypothesis 4b: The salary component of the CEO’s pay will decrease with the 
number of non-executives on the board. 
 
2.3.5 Proportion of executives/non-executives 
A similar argumentation can be used to hypothesize relationships with the board 
structure variable proportion of executives over non-executives and executive pay.  
Previous empirical results are mixed, ranging from no relationship to positive and 
negative relationships with pay and board structure variables like the proportion of 
executives over non-executives, proportion of inside and outside directors on the 
board, and the composition of remuneration committees (Conyon and Peck 1998; 
Core, Halthausen and Larcker, 1999; David, Kochlar, Levitas, 1998; Sanders and 
Carpenter, 1998; Daily, Johnson Ellstrand Daltan 1998). If making the conceptual 
difficult assumption as argued in section 3.2, that non-executives are truly altruistic 
doves and are truly independent and live up to their fiduciary duties, more non-
executives in proportion to executives will lower managerial discretion (cf. Conyon 
and Peck, 1998; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988; Yermack 
1996). To further strengthen the argumentation that less executives over more non-
executives decreases managerial discretion, outside directors are also brought on 
boards in order to bring critical resources into the firm (Hillman, Cannella, and 
Paetzold, 2000; Luoma and Goodstein, 1999; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Backed by 
the importance of the resources they represent, such directors could reduce 
management’s discretion. Using this argumentation, higher proportions of executives 
over non-executives are expected to increase managerial discretion, formulated as:  
 
Hypothesis 5a: Executive pay levels will increase with the proportion of 
executives over non-executives on the board.  
Hypothesis 5b: The salary component of the executive pay will increase with the 
proportion of executives over non-executives on the board. 
 
3 Theory extensions and hypotheses; step 2 
Of central concern to managerial power theorists is how executives can exploit or 
circumvent firm-level governance mechanisms in order to influence pay setting 
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practices and extract rents from the firm (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004, 2006). To 
date, the main body of theory and research on the role of managerial power in 
executive pay has originated in the United States and is strongly colored by that 
nation’s culture and institutional makeup (cf. Conyon and Schwalbach, 2000; Conyon 
and Murphy 2000, Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997; Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004). 
Yet, prior research has shown that precisely in the US “CEOs receive higher levels of 
pay than those in other [economically advanced] countries” (Abowd and Kaplan, 
1999: 148). This not only raises questions about the generalizability of explanations of 
a theory to global settings but also about the role of context in that particular theory 
(cf. Bruce, Buck and Main, 2005; Gomez-Mejia, Wiseman, Dykes 2005; Gomez-
Mejia and Wiseman, 1997). Despite the repeated pleas for more attention to the role 
of contingency factors in executive pay (e.g. Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; 
Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997), very little is known 
about possible influences from national institutional contexts of executive pay setting 
practices. 
The core theoretical premise followed is that the efficacy of a given firm-level 
corporate governance mechanism is contingent on the quality and makeup of the 
background institutions of the country in which that mechanism is put to work 
(Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997). Mechanisms require judgments of their applications 
in society in the sense that they have to adhere to social needs, wants and acceptance 
(Perkins and Hendry 2005). More specifically, when national background institutions 
are strongly developed and functionally complementary to firm-level governance 
mechanisms, the potential of the latter for mitigating managerial power will increase. 
For example, a firm-level information disclosure policy can be stiffened by a national 
information regime characterized by widely dispersed independent media and well-
trained business analysts (cf. Khanna and Palepu, 2000). In contrast, much of a firm-
level governance mechanism’s capacity for influencing managerial discretion can be 
destroyed by weakly developed or counter-purposive national institutions. For 
example, managerial fiduciary duties towards shareholders lose much of their 
meaning when courts hide behind a “business judgment rule” or are otherwise 
unwilling to uphold them (cf. Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Easterbrook and Fishel, 
1991).  
In short, managerial power theory is extended by arguing and demonstrating how 
its predictions are contingent on the quality of complementary background institutions 
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in a given jurisdiction. This institutional theoretical extension of the theory and 
theoretical contribution should be evaluated against a) the empirical results that 
provide more insights into the possible generalization of the theory in a cross country 
sample, and b) to provide managerial power theoretical with extensions that make 
predictions given the specifics of certain contextual conditions.  
 
3.1 Legal institutions and managerial power 
The role of legal institutions in corporate governance has already attracted 
considerable attention. Prior research has shown that better legal protection enlarges 
and broadens capital markets (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
1998), leads to higher valuation of the firms listed in a given jurisdiction (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2002), and generally increases economic growth 
(Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2003). One micro 
foundation that appears to produce these macro outcomes is that well-developed legal 
institutions help tame influential managers directly. Specifically, differences in the 
level of legal protection investors enjoy across countries seem to influence the ability 
of insiders to expropriate outsiders (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002). Given adequate 
legal protection, outsiders can sue “tunneling”1 or “self-dealing” executives in court 
in the justified expectation that judges will acknowledge their rights and punish the 
transgressors (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2005). Increase 
legal protection is therefore expected to decrease managerial discretion, thus lowering 
pay levels and make pay at least in principal more contingent on performance.  
 
Hypothesis 6a: Executive pay levels will be lower in countries offering better 
legal protection to investors.  
Hypothesis 6b: The salary component of executive pay will be lower in countries 
offering better legal protection to investors. 
 
Legal protection also helps tame managers indirectly, however, by increasing the 
efficacy of other governance mechanisms protecting shareholders or by rendering 
                                                 
1 Tunneling is transferring assets and profits out of firms, most often assumed to benefit controlling 
shareholders or executives and not per se smaller shareholders or other stakeholders of the firm. (See 
e.g. Djankov et al, 2005) 
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poor firm-level governance situations less harmful. CEO duality may be a case in 
point. US studies have repeatedly shown that there is a positive relationship between 
pay and duality (Boyd, 1994; Main and Johnston, 1993; Westphal and Zajac, 1995). 
Surprisingly, Conyon and Peck found that “CEO duality was not a robust driver of 
UK management pay” (1998: 154). Apparently, the extent to which CEO duality 
gives executives power over their own remuneration is contingent upon some other 
factor, which varies systematically across the two countries (cf. Barkema and Gomez-
Mejia, 1998). This factor might be the legal protection of investors, which is 
exceptionally high in the UK but only mediocre in the US (cf. Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2005). This contingency effect could be generalized 
as: better legal protection of investors negatively moderate the positive relationship 
between CEO duality and executive pay levels and structures, formalized in the 
following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 6c: The relationship between CEO duality and executive pay levels 
will be stronger in countries offering weaker legal protection to investors than 
in countries offering stronger protection.  
Hypothesis 6d: The relationship between CEO duality and the salary component 
of executive pay will be stronger in countries offering weaker legal protection to 
investors than in countries offering stronger protection. 
 
3.2 Cultural institutions and managerial power 
Compensation scholars have long speculated about the influence of national 
culture on executive pay levels (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Gomez-Mejia and 
Wiseman, 1997). Culture is expected to exert a direct influence on executive pay 
because the differential amounts of wealth high-placed officials can extract from the 
organizations they lead can be seen as “an illustration of the way in which different 
cultures see [money and monetary exchange] differently” (Bloch and Parry, 1989: 2). 
Previous research by Tosi and Greckhamer (2004) has shown that especially the 
cultural dimension of power distance—the degree to which differences in power and 
status are accepted in a culture (Hofstede, 2001)—bears a relation to executive pay. 
Executive pay is likely to be higher in high power distance countries for two reasons. 
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First, because organizations are structures of power and authority, they mirror how 
power in society is viewed. High power distance societies are likely to have more 
centralized, taller hierarchies, with higher pay levels towards the top. Second, 
executives from such societies are likely to have a greater psychological need for 
power, and for seeing that power is reflected by higher pay levels as pay reflects their 
mandate, abilities, expectations and prestige. In line with others, higher power 
distance in society provides executives with the social acceptance of using their power 
to increase pay levels and make it in principal less contingent on performance (Tosi 
and Greckhamer, 2004; Werner and Tosi, 1995).  Formally stated as:   
 
Hypothesis 7a: Executive pay levels will be higher in countries with higher 
levels of power distance.  
Hypothesis 7b: The salary component of the executive pay will be higher in 
countries with higher levels of power distance. 
 
National culture is also likely to influence pay indirectly via an effect on firm-
level governance mechanisms. According to Hofstede (2001), there is a tendency to 
more elitism in power distant societies, implying greater stratification, less direct 
contact between the strata, and a higher incidence of within-class loyalty and 
friendship (Useem, 1996).  Proposed is that non-executives play two roles in such 
societies —notably: (1) member of the national elite and possibly member of the same 
social class as executives, and (2) guardian of investor and stakeholder interests —and 
that these roles can be empirically separated. In a two-tier system, in which non-
executives meet independently, their stewardship role towards investors and the firm 
is more likely to rise to the fore, as their meetings are also called for the specific 
purpose of safeguarding financiers’ interests and operate as a separate entity in the 
organization. In a one-tier system, however, non-executives are constantly reminded 
of the fact that they share an elite position with the executives they are supposed to 
supervise. Under such conditions, it may be harder for them to separate themselves 
from their broader cultural frame of reference, which they share with the executives 
and in which it is seen as just and appropriate that those in positions of power extract 
more wealth from society—regardless of the performance of the firms they lead. It is 
therefore expected that one-tier board structures in societies with higher power 
distance increase the executives’ position to influence their pay. Thus:    
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Hypothesis 7c: The relationship between one-tiered board structures and 
executive pay levels will be stronger in countries with higher levels of power 
distance.  
Hypothesis 7d: The relationship between one-tiered board structures and the 
salary component of executive pay will be stronger in countries with higher 
levels of power distance. 
 
3.3 Political institutions and managerial power 
The political power of labor has been a central force in shaping much of the legal 
and regulatory design of the 20th century (Blair and Roe, 1999; Pagano and Volpin, 
2001;2005; Roe, 2000). Indeed, most countries around the world by now have 
developed complex and overlapping institutions intended to protect the interests of 
workers (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004). Although 
these institutions tend to be analyzed frequently from a social efficiency perspective 
(North, 1990), political theorists tend to remind us that political institutions are not a 
priory designed to pursue economic efficiency, but rather to shift resources from the 
powerless to the powerful (e.g. cf. March and Olsen, 1984; Meyer and Rowan, 1977 
Perrow, 1991; Roe, 2003). Even though the role of labor has historically been 
neglected in the corporate governance literature (Blair and Roe, 1999), it is no fancy 
to assume that employees can use their political influence in the corporate governance 
arena (cf Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004; Roe, 
2003). Traditional triggers for them to become active could be the rising of executive 
pay levels against a background of wage freezes for the rank-and-file or firm down-
sizes (cf. Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989, Gomez-Mejia, 1994, Jensen and Murphy 
2004, and Murphy, 1997), and more generally a possible lack of social acceptations of 
proportionality between executives and worker pay (cf. Simon, 1957). In general, 
expected can be a direct effect between the propensity of political institutions to 
protect employees and executives’ power over their pay levels and structures. Leading 
to the following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 8a: Executive pay levels will be lower in countries with higher levels 
of employee protection.  
Hypothesis 8b: The salary component of the CEO’s pay will be lower in 
countries with higher levels of employee protection. 
 
Employee protection might also influence executive pay levels and structures 
indirectly via an additional empowering effect of employees represented on the board. 
In the US, participation of employees in firm governance has historically been a rarity 
(Luoma and Goodstein, 1999). In countries like Germany, Sweden, and Japan, 
however, employee representation is customary and is typically seen as a cornerstone 
of competitive advantage and social stability (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Brown, 
Nakata, Reich, and Ulman, 1997). But worker representation alone is insufficient to 
give labor an important voice in firm governance. Like executives, workers are 
insiders, and depend for their income and livelihood on the firm whose fate they co-
determine. Moreover, even more so than other insiders on the board, they are in a 
clear hierarchical relationship with executives, who might seek to influence their 
judgment in matters pertaining to him or her. Thus, employees can only be expected 
to raise an independent voice when they are adequately protected against dismissal, 
demotion, and other forms of negative career consequences.  
 
Hypothesis 8c: The relationship between employee representation and executive 
pay levels will be stronger in countries with higher levels of employee 
protection.  
Hypothesis 8d: The relationship between employee representation and the 
salary component of executive pay will be stronger in countries with higher 
levels of employee protection. 
 
3.4 Voice and accountability and managerial power 
The news media have the power to directly influence and shape corporate policy, 
including corporate governance (Dyck and Zingales, 2002, 2004). They play also an 
important role in the justifying process of pay arrangements (Wade, Porac, Pollock 
1997) as they ventilate what Bebchuk and Fried (2004, 2006; Bebchuk, Fried, and 
Walker, 2002) have called “outrage” factors. Public outrage occurs when a particular 
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executives pay arrangements go so far beyond what could be justified that “it will be 
viewed by relevant outsiders as unjustified or even abusive or egregious” (Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2004: 65).  But for the outrage mechanism to work and to provide 
independent media the possibility to investigate and ventilate possible “unjustifiable” 
pay arrangements to be able to do something about it, two factors must be met. First, 
if pay is found to be excessive it must be sufficiently widespread among relevant 
groups of people about whose views executives care. But the media can not function 
without social processes of accountability. Thus to make the process work, second, 
the process must be backed by social institutions as civil liberties like freedom of 
speech, of association, and of holding those with responsibility of social mishaps 
accountable.  Both factors must be in place for the checks on executive power to work 
and to come from private ordering (cf. Williamson, 1985). 
 
Hypothesis 9a: Executive pay levels will be lower in countries with higher levels 
of voice and accountably.  
Hypothesis 9b: The salary component of the CEO’s pay will be lower in 
countries with higher levels of voice and accountability. 
 
The news media also shape executives pay packages indirectly via non-executive 
directors. Even though board members can sign off on pay packages that go beyond 
what executives could have extracted from the firm under arms-length contracting, 
there are limits to the board’s willingness to favor executives. It is especially unlikely 
that non-executives would approve an arrangement that could generate widespread 
outrage, as this has two serious effects for non-executives themselves (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2004; Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002). First, outrage has a negative effect of 
the “high-powered” (Williamson, 1985: 137-141) monetary incentives accruing to 
non-executives. Directors are selected on corporate boards on the basis of their 
reputation for expertise and independence in decision-making. Reputational damage 
can diminish a non-executive’s chances of being re-elected and of being appointed to 
other boards. Second, it also affects directors’ “low-powered” (Williamson, 1985: 
137-141) incentives like conscience, pride, and social esteem. These effects backed up 
by a society with higher standards on institutions reflecting voice and accountability 
may constrain executives’ power. The first effect is not necessarily less important than 
the latter, as many outside directors join boards not for the pay but for the prestige and 
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connections that are associated with these posts (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). 
Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 9c: The relationship between the number of non-executives on the 
board and executive pay levels will be stronger in countries with higher levels of 
voice and accountability.  
Hypothesis 9d: The relationship between the number of non-executives on the 
board and the salary component of executive pay will be stronger in countries 
with higher levels of voice and accountability. 
 
3.5 Economic financial institutions and managerial power 
Country-level economic institutions—especially financial institutions—are 
strongly linked to economic growth in general and firm-level drivers of such growth 
in particular (Levine, 1997, Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Financial institutions like 
stock markets, banks, securities analysts, and rating agencies intervene as 
intermediaries in less-than-perfect markets, to the effect of lowering information and 
transaction costs (Khanna and Palepu, 2001). Financial institutions enter the executive 
pay arena in two ways. First, they regulate and shape the market for corporate control 
(Manne, 1965). High excessive pay can be regarded as a sign of weak governance 
resulting in more pervasive management shortcomings and chronic 
underperformance, and is thus a signal to corporate raiders that the firm might be an 
attractive takeover target (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Well-developed financial 
institutions supply raiders with both detailed information for making accurate 
performance potential estimates, communication channels towards dispersed 
stakeholders they need to reach in case of a proxy fight, and sophisticated financial 
instruments for closing appropriate deals. Second, financial institutions control the 
market for additional capital. Firms occasionally have to return to the market for 
additional equity capital in order to pay for substantial investments. The prospect of 
having to sell shares to the public might cause managers to seek a reputation as 
corporate stewards and conservative self-compensators (cf. Bebchuck and Fried, 
2004;2003; Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002). Thus, the well functioning and 
importance of financial economic institutions for a countries economy might therefore 
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exert disciplining pressures on executive pay levels and structures. Formulated as the 
following hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 10a: Executive pay levels will be lower in countries with more 
important financial economic institutions for a countries economy.  
Hypothesis 10b: The salary component of executive pay will be lower in 
countries with more important financial economic institutions for a countries 
economy. 
 
Financial institutions are also expected to indirectly disciple managers by 
complementing the control efforts of the corporate board. Walsh and Seward (1990) 
have described boards and financial institutions as internal and external managerial 
control mechanisms respectively. Internal control mechanisms, such as enlarging the 
proportion of outsiders on a board (Kosnik, 1987), are “designed to bring the interests 
of managers and shareholders into congruence” (Walsh and Seward, 1990: 423). Such 
internal control mechanisms are rendered ineffectual, however, when managers 
entrench themselves by tampering with the board’s ability to monitor and control their 
performance (Berger, Ofek, and Yermack, 1997). External control mechanisms, such 
as the market for corporate control, can then be relied upon as an alternate control 
mechanism for taming self-enriching managers. Internal control mechanisms like the 
proportion of executives over non-executive board members and external control 
mechanisms like important financial institutions for a countries economy can thus be 
seen as complementary governance options that operate better in tandem—although 
not necessarily simultaneously (Walsh and Seward, 1990).Resulting in the next set of 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 10c: The relationship between the proportion of executives over non-
executives on the board and executive pay levels will be stronger in countries 
with more important financial economic institutions for a countries economy.  
Hypothesis 10d: The relationship between the proportion of non-executives on 
the board and the salary component of the executive pay will be stronger in 
countries with more important financial economic institutions for a countries 
economy. 
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4 Testing managerial power theory and its extension 
To be able to test managerial power theory and the extension to provide 
generalizations of managerial power theoretical predictions given specifics of certain 
institutional contextual conditions, a cross national sample of executive pay packages 
was complied. The sample was designed to provide a representative overview of 
executive pay in the global business landscape, and includes firms from 17 countries. 
The selected countries are based on their economic impact on the world economy, 
computed as the average size of their GDP from 1999 to 2003 (source: World Bank 
Indicators). Some countries have such weak disclosure regimes however, that reliable 
pay data was not available. Such countries were excluded from the sample, and added 
by the next largest to replace it. The firm-level data collection efforts were 
simultaneously aimed at breadth and depth. To realize the former, the aim was to 
collect 2003 data for all the countries in the sample. The latter aim was reached by 
adding further observations for firms from 8 countries for the years 2001, 2002, and 
2004 to the sample as for the other 9 countries data availability was limited before 
2003. For comparability reasons, the aim was to collect data on the largest 30 listed 
firms in a country.  Thereby, the practical reason for choosing the largest firms is that 
larger firms tend to disclose more pay data. However, some countries have a relative 
very limited number of listed firms (e.g. Austria, Denmark, Finland) and for many 
firms from different countries and for different years, annual reports or other company 
reports disclosing pay data were not available. As an exception, also for comparison 
reasons, for the US the aim was to collect data for 50 firms as the US has many, 
especially in comparison to many other countries, very large listed firms. In all cases, 
the proportion of financial institutions like banks and insurance companies was 
limited to 20% of the country’s sample in order to increase the comparability of the 
results across nations and industries, as financial firms are drastically overrepresented 
in some nations, financial firms could be a special case in corporate governance 
(Adams and Mehran, 2003) and the possible effects from overrepresentation of a 
single industry that could drive the results (See for industry influences on pay e.g. 
Coles, McWilliams and Sen 2001, Gibbons and Murphy 1990, Garvey and Milbourn 
2003).   
The final sample consists of 3880 pay levels and 1195 pay structures representing 
940 firm-year observations from 17 countries. To make the data comparable across 
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national contexts and sample years, all monetary variables are purchasing power 
parity (PPP)-adjusted, with 2000 as base year and in constant 2000 United States 
Dollars. Table 1, 2, and 3 provide an overview of the sample of the country specific 
firm-year observations. 
 
TABLE 1 
Overview of the Total Sample a 
Country  Firm-year observations 
Australia* 44 
Austria 12 
Canada* 99 
Denmark 10 
Finland 12 
France* 94 
Germany* 110 
Hong Kong 10 
Italy 21 
Netherlands* 96 
Norway 20 
South Africa* 96 
Spain 30 
Sweden 19 
Switzerland 20 
United Kingdom* 80 
United States* 167 
Total firm year observations 940 
a Countries marked with an asterisk are included in the  
longitudinal (2001-2004) data panel; for the others  
only 2003 data is available 
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TABLE 2   
Sample overview year 2003 
Country  Firm observations 
Australia 20 
Austria 12 
Canada 31 
Denmark 10 
Finland 12 
France 30 
Germany 30 
Hong Kong 10 
Italy 21 
Netherlands 25 
Norway 20 
South Africa 30 
Spain 30 
Sweden 19 
Switzerland 20 
United Kingdom 30 
United States 50 
Total firm observations 400 
 
TABLE 3 
Sample overview years 2001, 2002, and 2004 
 Firm observations 
Country 2001 2002 2004 
Australia 8 9 7 
Canada 21 25 22 
France 20 22 22 
Germany 26 28 26 
Netherlands 24 25 22 
South Africa 21 24 21 
United Kingdom 16 19 15 
United States 37 39 41 
Total observations 173 191 176 
 
 
4.1 Dependent variables 
Outside the major Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, pay disclosure is by all means still a 
novelty. Disclosure is still largely voluntary in many parts of the developed world. 
Companies in many jurisdictions can choose whether to report data at all, report 
individual executive data or data aggregated for all executives on the board. Reliable 
long-term pay data (e.g., stock options, restricted stock, and long-term incentive 
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plans) is in general rare. Therefore the collect data is cash data (salary, bonus, and 
total cash) for both CEOs individually and total executives on the board (averaged by 
number). Total cash pay is the sum of salary and bonus, and is a frequently used 
measure in studies of CEO pay (e.g. Boyd, 1994; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1998). 
Furthermore, the total cash measure has been found to be an excellent proxy for total 
remuneration (including non-cash components), since the explanatory patterns for 
both measures do not differ (Core, Halthausen and Larcker, 1999; Lewellen and 
Huntsman, 1970). In fact, additional analyses on a 12-country panel (10 of which are 
also represented in the sample used here) compiled by Abowd and Kaplan (1999) 
show that in 1996 the proportion of total cash pay to total pay for CEOs ranged from 
1.25 (Germany) to 1.66 (UK), averaged on 1.48, and had a standard deviation of only 
0.17. Thus, total cash measures serve as a very good proxy for total pay (Boyd, 1994; 
Core, Halthausen and Larcker, 1999; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1998). The US pay 
data was collected from companies’ proxy statements, for all other countries pay data 
was retrieved from annual reports.  
CEO total cash was measured as the total of CEO salary and CEO bonus. 
Executive total cash was measured as the total of executive salary and executive 
bonus, averaged over the number of executives on the board including the CEO. The 
logarithm of pay levels are used as dependent variables in the pay level models.   
The proportion of CEO salary/total cash and Executive salary/total cash is 
computed by dividing the salary by total cash components of respectively CEOs and 
averaged executives, and express the relative focus on salary (as compared to bonus) 
and as a reflection of the importance of fixed pay, and the at least in theory, less 
dependence on pay that is at outcome risks. Table 4 provides an overview of the 
average pay levels and structures for all the countries in the data set; Table 5 provides 
an overview of the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables. 
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TABLE 4 
Mean pay levels and structures all firm-year observations 
Country 
(Pay in US$) 
CEO Total 
cash 
Executive 
Total cash 
CEO 
Salary 
Executive 
Salary 
CEO 
Bonus 
Executive 
Bonus 
CEO 
Salary/ Total 
cash 
Executive 
Salary/ Total 
cash 
Australia 1.818.347 847.187 968.722 493.940 934.587 384.416 0,608 0,596
Austria 544.996 565.358 346.920 337.019 198.077 232.587 0,657 0,601
Canada 1.920.247 1.251.384 781.429 625.829 1.410.775 695.800 0,508 0,601
Denmark 650.712 416.939 584.112 429.295 93.328 132.870 0,862 0,766
Finland 658.390 436.785 562540 284.791 137.185 131.386 0,801 0,791
France 1.895.236 1.028.609 1.104.743 609.695 1.057.553 563.537 0,516 0,539
Germany 2.072.468 1.331.927 867.172 545.350 1.428.166 831.952 0,428 0,461
Hong Kong 699.721 776.247 788.191 456.059 530.823 320.188 0,598 0,645
Italy 1.369.791 970.578  857.586 0,571
Netherlands 1.117.233 853.838 662.998 532.239 459.456 330.309 0,667 0,652
Norway 288.837 207.600 269.294 156.780 43.429 20.294 0,886 0,885
South Africa 1.522.656 939.459 853.381 578.051 774.495 401.888 0,595 0,631
Spain 992.191 553.930  1.231.900 0,497
Sweden 846.845 470.965 611.984 323.323 247.908 171.289 0,747 0,714
Switzerland 1.638.072 777.590 1.409.954 1.138.612 619.260 178.971 0,801 0,786
United Kingdom 1.819.246 1.202.671 1.011.103 672.748 850.677 547.588 0,597 0,617
United States 4.335.054 3.695.394 1.261.363 1.027.420 3.138.628 2.690.207 0,384 0,405
Full sample mean  2.112.076 1.473.971 931.448 655.819 1.393.856 958.340 0,544 0,553
Full sample S.D. 2.198.783 1.680.263 604.764 449.799 2.067.387 1.575.783 0,231 0,214
Full sample N 731 703 688 631 609 583 609 583
 
 28
TABLE 5 
Descriptive statistics dependent variables  
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. 
Log CEO Total cash 731 9,828 17,150 14,180 0,938
Log CEO Bonus 560 8,699 17,117 13,623 1,176
Log CEO Salary 688 9,439 16,009 13,566 0,667
CEO Salary  /Total cash 609 0,033 1 0,544 0,231
Log Executive Total cash 703 9,725 16,539 13,815 0,857
Log Executive Salary 631 9,413 15,550 13,223 0,600
Log Executive Bonus 567 8,409 16,483 13,046 1,254
Executive Salary /Total cash  583 0,036 1 0,553 0,214
 
4.2 Independent variables 
The main independent variables that are under investigation consist of firm-level 
variables, country-level variables and the interaction variables between the two. Each 
of the variables is used to test the different hypotheses as stated above. See table 6 
below for the complete list and descriptive statistics. 
 
4.2.1 Firm-level variables 
The CEO duality variable is measures with a dummy variable, which was set to 
one if the posts of CEO and chairman were combined and to zero otherwise (Conyon 
and Peck, 1998; Sanders and Carpenter, 1998; Zajac and Westphal, 2004). The one-
tier board variable was also measured with a dummy variable, and was set to one for 
one-tier boards and set to zero for two-tier board structures. Thus if there was a single 
board composed of both executives and non-executives the dummy is one, and  zero if 
there was a separate supervisory board composed entirely of non-executives (Franks 
and Mayer, 2001). The variable employee on board was measured also as a dummy 
variable, and set to one if at least one board member was a non-managerial employee 
of the firm and to zero if otherwise. The number of non-executives variable was 
measured as a count variable and expresses the absolute number of non-executive 
directors on the board (Conyon and Peck, 1998). The proportion executives/non-
executives variable was computed by dividing the number of executives on the board 
by the number of non-executives on the board (Conyon and Peck, 1998; Lambert, 
Larcker, and Weigelt, 1993; Westphal and Zajac, 1994).  
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4.2.2 Country-level variables 
As a measure for shareholder protection against insider self-dealing the anti-self-
dealing index from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2005/6) was 
used. The index measures jurisdictions’ scores on both ex-ante anti-self-dealing 
provisions like approval and disclosure requirements and ex-post provisions like the 
ease of proving wrongdoing, and expresses them as a coefficient ranging from 0 (poor 
protection) to 1 (excellent protection). The index was recently adapted from a prior 
‘anti-director’ index (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1998) and shows 
excellent predictive validity on a number of stock market development criteria 
(Djankov et al., 2006). To measure power distance the value scores for this dimension 
of national culture as they are reported by Hofstede (1980) was used. The scale on 
which these scores are expressed runs from 0 (low power distance) to 100 (high 
power distance). The Hofstede scores have been replicated in other studies (Hofstede, 
2001; Sondergaard, 1994) and especially power distance has demonstrated its 
predictive validity in studies of executive pay (Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004). To 
measure Employee protection the ‘employment laws index’ compiled by Botero, 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) was used. This index 
measures the economic costs to employers of adopting contracts other than full-time, 
unlimited duration contracts, of increasing hours worked (i.e., overtime), and of firing 
workers, as well as the legal constraints to dismissal. The index runs from 0 (poor 
protection) to 1 (excellent protection). Empirical analyses with this variable subscribe 
to it being also as a political factor, as countries with longer histories of leftist or 
centrist governments between 1928 and 1995 have heavier regulation of labor markets 
and role of employees in corporate governance (Botero et al., 2004, Roe, 2003).  
For the measure of voice and accountability, which measures the freedom of the 
media in a given jurisdiction as well as the extent to which this freedom is supported 
by relevant civil rights and liberties and holding those in power accountable for social 
processes, the index compiled by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005) is used. 
The index, which is scaled from 0 (poor standards of institutional voice and 
accountability and low media freedom) to 1 (high standards of institutional voice and 
accountability and high media freedom) has been used and validated in several 
empirical studies (Knack and Kiefer, 1995; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, 2004). 
Finally, to proxy for the importance of financial economic institutions for a countries 
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economy the variable Stock market capitalization/GDP, as calculated as the value of 
all listed shares over GDP was used. The data derives from the World Bank’s 
‘financial development and structure’ database. To adjust for temporal economic 
shocks during the study period, the variable is a calculated average over the years 
2001-2004. 
 
4.2.3 Firm-country interaction variables 
As hypothesized, the firm level variables are expected to interact with country 
specific variables. The different interaction effects are calculated as the product of a 
firm level variable and its matched country level variable resulting in the following 5 
interaction variables; 1) Self-dealing * CEO duality as the product of the anti-self-
dealing index and the CEO duality dummy; 2) Power distance * one-tier as measured 
as the product of the Hofstede power score and the one-tier board structure dummy; 3) 
Employee protection * employee on board as the product of the employee on board 
dummy and the labor protection index; 4) Voice and accountability * number of non-
executives as the product of both variables voice and accountability variable and 
number of non-executive; and 5) Stock market capitalization/GDP * executives/non-
executives as the product of Stock market capitalization/GDP and proportion 
executives/non-executives variables. 
 
4.3 Control variables 
To control for firm specific effects and country specific effects several firm levels 
controls and country levels controls are included in the regression analyses. See table 
6 below for the descriptive statistics for all independent variables as discussed above 
and control variables that are discussed below.  
 
4.3.1 Firm-level controls 
Past research has shown that firm size is one of the most important determinants 
of executive pay (Tosi et al., 2000). To control for firm size effects the logarithm of 
firm sales is used, which is the most common measure of firm size in executive pay 
studies (Tosi et al., 2000). Sales data for all firms in the sample were derived from the 
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Thompson Financial’s ‘DataStream’ database. Many executive pay studies have 
historically set out to test the performance sensitivity of pay (Gomez-Mejia and 
Wiseman, 1997). To control for firm performance, the measure return on equity in the 
year preceding the one in which a particular pay package was awarded was used, as is 
common practice in most studies (cf. Tosi et al., 2000). Performance data was 
similarly derived from DataStream.  
To control for CEOs’ life cycle stage-dependent cash needs CEO age, both as a 
monotonic and as a quadratic relationship (CEO age2) are used in the models with 
CEO pay as dependent variable. The rationale behind these variables is that CEOs’ 
cash needs are higher in the earlier stages of his career and lower at later stages (cf. 
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989). Age data was derived from firms’ annual reports. 
To control for industry effects (Coles, McWilliams and Sen 2001, Gibbons and 
Murphy 1990, Garvey and Milbourn 2003, Porac, Wade and Pollock 1999) on pay 10 
industry dummies (basic industry, consumer goods, consumer services, financials, 
healthcare, industrials, oil and gas, technology, telecommunications, and utilities; 
source: DataStream) are included in the regression analyses. 
 
4.3.2 Country-level controls 
To control for the influence of the size of a given country’s economy, the measure 
(a logarithm of) GDP, as an average over the years 2001-2004 was used (Pedersen 
and Thomsen, 1997; Roe, 2003; Thomsen and Pedersen, 1996; 2000). GDP data was 
derived from the World Bank’s ‘world development indicators’ database. 
Furthermore, corporate tax rate and income tax rate were controlled for, as the former 
can influence the net cost of executive pay to the corporation and the latter the net 
benefit of remuneration for individual executives (cf. Abowd and Bognanno 1995). 
Both rates were derived from the Heritage Foundation’s (2006) ‘Index of Economic 
Freedom.’ A last control in order to control for time-dependent social and economic 
shocks, year dummies for each of the years in the data base (2001 through 2004) 
where included. Table 6 reports descriptive statistics for all independent and control 
variables.  
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TABLE 6 
Descriptive statistics independent variables 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. 
Practices     
CEO duality 0 1 0,311 0,463 
Dummy one-tier 0 1 0,693 0,461 
Dummy employees on the board 0 1 0,191 0,394 
Number of non-executives 4 34 13,167 4,658 
Proportion executives/ non-executives 0,045 5,5 0,474 0,481 
Contextual determinants     
Self-dealing index 2,5 5 3,573 0,898 
Power distance 11 68 42,081 11,368 
Employee protection index 0,170 0,746 0,471 0,223 
Voice and Accountability index 0,206 1,585 1,279 0,214 
Average stock market capitalization/ GDP 
(years 2001-2004) 
0,174 3,808 1,058 0,468 
Firm level controls      
Log sales 12,529 19,300 16,396 1,200 
Return on Equity (t-1) -291,33 113,15 11,681 25 
CEO age 36 78 54,725 6,267 
CEO age2 1296 6084 3034,079 686,960 
Dummy basic industry 0 1 0,101 0,301 
Dummy consumer goods 0 1 0,131 0,338 
Dummy consumer services 0 1 0,185 0,388 
Dummy financials 0 1 0,197 0,400 
Dummy healthcare 0 1 0,028 0,166 
Dummy industrials 0 1 0,190 0,393 
Dummy oil and gas 0 1 0,057 0,232 
Dummy technology 0 1 0,027 0,163 
Dummy telecommunications 0 1 0,046 0,209 
Dummy utilities 0 1 0,038 0,192 
Country level controls     
Log average GDP (years 2001-2004) 39,223 43,188 41,332 1,214 
Corporate tax rate 17,5% 35% 29,894 4,318 
Income tax rate 16% 60% 41,506 7,950 
 
 
5 Estimation method 
Since all the estimated models have continuous dependent variables, pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are used to test the hypotheses. In line with 
standard OLS regression assumptions, all relevant explanatory variables are assumed 
to be included in the model. In more formal terms, this weak exogeneity assumption 
states that the period t  error term of the regression equation is uncorrelated with any 
of the explanatory variables measured in the same period. This assumption does not 
rule out feedback effects, which are highly relevant in a study that assesses the 
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influence of institutional factors on executive pay. An example of such feedback 
effects could be that policy makers in a given jurisdiction change regulations in period 
t in response to public outcry over pay levels in period t-1. In contrast, fixed effects 
models assume strict endogeneity, and rule out the possibility of accounting for these 
highly relevant feedback effects. OLS regressions are thus the appropriate method for 
estimating consistent coefficients. To compute reliable standard errors for the OLS-
estimated coefficients, allowed is for the possibility that the error terms of the 
regression equations might be correlated within a country and across time (the 
possible existence of autocorrelation) by using the ‘cluster’ option in STATA,  the 
used econometric data analysis program. To avoid possible problems of 
heteroskedasticity, White robust standard errors were calculated and reported. 
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TABLE 7 
Correlations CEO pay data 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Log CEO total cash              
2. Log CEO salary   0,797a             
3. Log CEO bonus   0,939a   0,558a            
4. Prop. salary/ tot. cash  -0,661a  -0,137a  -0,866a           
5. CEO duality    0,316a   0,246a   0,436a  -0,299a          
6. One-tier   0,269a   0,259a   0,314a  -0,192a   0,447a         
7. Employee on board  -0,184a  -0,134a  -0,156a   0,062  -0,258a -0,574a        
8. Nr. non-executive   0,182a   0,148a   0,214a  -0,187a   0,084b 0,025   0,421a       
9. Prop. exe./ non-exe.  -0,219a  -0,112a  -0,276a   0,277a  -0,163a -0,164a  -0,014  -0,192a      
10. Self-dealing index  -0,150a  -0,067b  -0,180a   0,166a  -0,151a 0,517a  -0,414a  -0,107a   0,114a     
11. Power distance   0,015    0.037   0,073c  -0,095b   0,342a 0,304a  -0,349a   0,087a  -0,026   0,106a    
12. Empl. protection  -0,381a  -0,301a  -0,394a   0,264a  -0,254a -0,670a   0,467a   0,034   0,191a  -0,437a   0,204a   
13. Voice and account.  -0,101a  -0.074b  -0,173a   0,164a  -0,210a -0,444a   0,273a  -0,229a   0,107a  -0,340a  -0,530a   0,358a  
14. Stock market cap./ GDP   0,206a   0,274a   0.164a  -0,047   0,172a 0,447a  -0,551a  -0,236a   0174a   0,441a   0,149a  -0,557a -0,483a 
a p < 0,01; b p<0,05 
TABLE 8 
Correlations average executive pay data 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
1. Log CEO total cash     
2. Log CEO salary   0,801a    
3. Log CEO bonus   0,925a   0,594a   
4. Prop. salary/ tot. cash  -0,717a  -0,223a  -0,888a  
5. CEO duality    0,327a   0,267a   0,390a  -0,246a 
6. One-tier   0,175a   0,151a   0,140a  -0,047 
7. Employee on board  -0,106a  -0,168a  -0,021  -0,087b 
8. Nr. non-executive   0,137a   0,001   0,157a  -0,189a 
9. Prop. exe./ non-exe.  -0,233a  -0,128a  -0,252a   0,207a 
10. Self-dealing index  -0,166a  -0,095b  -0,267a   0.242a 
11. Power distance   0,016  -0,007  -0,009  -0,013 
12. Empl. Protection  -0,323a  -0,284a  -0,282a   0,154a 
13. Voice and account.  -0,097b  -0,042  -0,030   0,038 
14. Stock market cap./ GDP   0,075b   0,161a  -0,012a   0,089b 
a p < 0,01; b p<0,05 
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6 Empirical Results  
Tables 7 and 8 show the correlation matrices of the dependent and main 
independent variables used in the analysis. Table 7 reports correlations for the CEO 
data, Table 8 for average executive data.  
The results of the regression analyses are presented in two steps of models for 
both the CEO pay dependent variables as the executive pay dependent variables. The 
two steps consist of models with: 1) firm-level main effects plus country dummies 
adjusted for within-cluster correlation; and 2) the full models including all controls 
and interaction terms and adjusted for within-cluster correlation. Given that the two 
data panels (CEO remuneration data and average executive remuneration data) and 
four dependent variables (total cash, salary, bonus, and salary/total cash), a total of 16 
(2 steps * 2 groups CEO- executives * 4 pay dependent) regression models where 
estimated. In the discussion of the results the corresponding model identity number, as 
can be seen in the tables shown below, serve as a reference to the estimated results of 
the models for the different steps.  Tables 9 (Models 1 through 4) and 10 (Models 5 
through 8) report step 1, the OLS regression results for the models with firm-level 
main effects only for CEOs and average executives respectively. Tables 11 (models 9 
through 12) and 12 (models 13 through 16) report the results of step 2, the full models 
with respectively CEO pay and average executive pay. The results of the models of 
the first step will only be shortly discussed. The results of the full models are more 
systematically assessed and discussed. As robustness checks of the results of the full 
models, extra models are estimated with only the 2003 observations. 
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TABLE 9 
CEO pay models with firm-level main effects A, B, C 
OLS regression results with country clusters  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 CEO 
Total cash 
CEO  
Salary 
CEO  
Bonus 
CEO 
Salary / 
Total cash 
CEO duality 0.244 0.175 0.128 -0.036 
    (2.56)** (1.50) (1.17)    (2.86)** 
One-tier 0.130 0.359 0.041 0.088 
 (0.69) (1.49) (0.19)   (2.13)** 
Employee on board -0.126 -0.243 0.019 -0.073 
 (1.18)      (4.88)*** (0.11)  (1.82)* 
Nr. non-executives 0.017 0.014 0.001 0.002 
 (1.45) (1.24) (0.04) (0.45) 
Prop. exec/ non-exec. -0.096 -0.058 0.049 0.006 
 (1.17) (1.09) (0.43) (0.20) 
Sales 0.213 0.237 0.271 0.013 
     (6.52)***     (6.60)***     (3.79)*** (1.61) 
Return on equity 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.66) (0.52) (1.28) (1.24) 
CEO age  0.061 0.069 -0.163 -0.013 
 (0.75) (1.51) (1.07) (0.46) 
CEO age2 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.000 
 (0.79) (1.56) (1.13) (0.56) 
Constant 9.518 7.632 12.892 0.622 
     (4.71)***     (6.78)***      (2.96)*** (0.83) 
Observations 608 579 483 526 
R-squared 0.48 0.42 0.50 0.32 
Nr. Clusters 17 17 17 17 
       A. * significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% . 
       B. White robust t statistics in parentheses 
       C. Industry and Country dummies not reported  
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TABLE 10 
Average executive pay models with firm-level main effect A, B, C 
OLS regression results with country clusters  
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Executive 
Total cash 
Executive 
Salary 
Executive 
Bonus 
Executive 
Salary / Total 
cash 
CEO duality  0.028 -0.030 0.221 -0.016 
 (0.63) (0.32) (2.14)* (0.49) 
One-tier -0.142 -0.211 -0.091 0.073 
 (1.09) (0.87) (0.29) (1.88)* 
Employee on board  0.561  0.671 0.920 -0.162 
     (2.92)**     (3.74)***     (5.77)***      (3.99)*** 
Nr non-executives  -0.002 -0.008 -0.013 0.001 
 (0.21) (0.97) (0.86) (0.25) 
Prop. exec/ non-exec. -0.008 -0.049 0.077 -0.035 
 (0.14) (0.77) (0.51) (1.28) 
Sales  0.272 0.232 0.290 -0.013 
      (3.71)***     (6.87)***     (4.04)*** (0.98) 
Return on equity -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.26) (0.70) (0.23) (0.51) 
Constant  8.146  8.335 7.440 1.220 
      (8.11)***    (20.26)***     (6.28)***     (8.44)*** 
Observations 666 596 534 550 
R-squared 0.48 0.37 0.51 0.30 
Nr. Clusters 15 15 15 15 
       A. * significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% . 
       B. White robust t statistics in parentheses 
       C. Industry and Country dummies not reported  
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6.1 Results simple models 
As tables 9 and 10 report, CEO duality seems to positively influence pay levels 
and negatively influence the proportion of salary over total cash. Possibly the 
discretion especially CEOs have over their pay levels seems to be traded-off by less 
discretion over the importance of pay that is in theory more contingent on 
performance. One-tiered board structures seem to have no effects on pay levels but 
seem to increase discretion over pay structures. Surprisingly employee representation 
on the board limits discretion over CEO pay levels but not for executive pay levels. 
Furthermore, it seems to limit discretion over pay structures for CEOs and executives 
as the salary over total cash coefficients are negative. Both the absolute number of 
non-executives and the proportion of executives over non executives seem to have no 
effects on pay levels and structures. All in all, these results provide a first indication  
that executives and CEOs’ discretion is mediated by firm level corporate governance 
mechanisms, also in a cross national sample. The results of the full model, as 
discussed below, will provide further insights in the relationships with specific 
institutional contexts.       
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TABLE 11 
CEO pay full models A, B, C 
OLS regression results with country clusters 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 CEO 
Total cash 
CEO 
Salary 
CEO 
Bonus 
CEO Salary / 
Total cash 
Self-dealing -0.062 0.044 -0.267 0.037 
       (1.00) (0.81)    (2.17)**    (2.50)** 
CEO duality  1.312 0.938 0.805 0.005 
     (2.81) **      (2.96)***    (2.66)** (0.09) 
Interaction Self-dealing*CEO duality  -0.306 -0.230 -0.180 -0.012 
     (2.20)**    (2.59)**   (1.99)* (0.78) 
Power distance -0.008 -0.014 0.009 -0.004 
 (1.09)    (2.17)** (0.67) (1.70) 
One-tier 0.308 -0.481 -0.373 -0.014 
 (0.61) (1.24) (0.68) (0.12) 
Interaction Power distance*One-tier -0.005 0.014 0.002 0.003 
 (0.57)    (2.29)** (0.21) (1.07) 
Employee protection -0.816 -0.652 -3.208 0.347 
 (1.10) (0.81)     (2.44)** (1.84)* 
Employee on board -1.267 -1.284 -4.430 0.358 
 (1.20) (1.23)     (2.45)** (0.78) 
Inter. Empl. protection* Empl. on board 1.164 1.210 5.685 -0.547 
 (0.75) (0.83)    (2.34)** (0.91) 
Voice and accountability -0.744 -0.380 -1.945 0.454 
 (1.14) (1.20)    (2.63)**      (3.95)*** 
Nr. non-executives -0.013 -0.024 -0.085 0.021 
 (0.22) (1.14) (1.13)    (2.19)** 
Inter.. Voice and account. * Nr. non-exec. 0.031 0.034 0.077 -0.017 
 (0.68) (1.85)* (1.28) (1.78)* 
Av stock market capitalization/ GDP  -0.339 -0.112 -0.651 0.123 
   (1.84)* (0.56)    (2.25)** (1.92)* 
Prop. executives/ non executives -0.343 -0.286 -0.612 0.152 
 (1.40)    (2.17)** (1.79)* (1.98)* 
Inter. Av. stock market/GDP *exec./non-exec. 0.193 0.194 0.459 -0.103 
 (1.01)   (2.13)** (2.11)*  (2.11)* 
Sales 0.234 0.244 0.283 0.012 
      (6.82)***     (6.85)***      (3.84)*** (1.16) 
Return on equity 0.001 -0.000 -0.003 -0.001 
      (0.53) (0.00) (1.11) (1.16) 
CEO age 0.091 0.074 -0.156 -0.010 
      (1.08) (1.57) (1.05) (0.36) 
CEO age2       -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.000 
      (1.08) (1.57) (1.12) (0.45) 
Average GDP  0.012 -0.032 0.091 -0.057 
      (0.15) (0.54) (0.78)    (2.36)** 
Corporate tax  0.002 -0.018 -0.051 0.004 
      (0.12) (1.14) (1.22) (0.66) 
Income tax 0.011 0.019 0.033 -0.003 
      (1.00) (1.58) (1.20) (0.62) 
Constant 8.759 9.562 14.579 2.002 
   (2.15)**    (4.59)***     (2.33)** (1.46) 
Observations 608 579 483 526 
R-squared 0.46 0.40 0.49 0.32 
Nr. Clusters 17 17 17 17 
A. * significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% . 
B. White robust t statistics in parentheses 
C. Industry and Country dummies not reported 
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TABLE 12 
Average executive pay full models A, B, C 
OLS regression results with country clusters 
 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
 Executive 
Total cash 
Executive 
Salary 
Executive 
Bonus 
Executive 
Salary / Total 
cash 
Self-dealing -0.150 -0.016 -0.302 0.062 
      (6.31)*** (0.40)      (4.29)***      (3.78)*** 
CEO duality 0.005 0.720 -0.160 0.221 
 (0.02) (1.87)* (0.33)    (2.49)** 
Interaction Self-dealing*CEO duality  -0.002 -0.211 0.098 -0.062 
 (0.02) (1.86)* (0.77)    (2.33)** 
Power distance -0.002 -0.002 -0.021 -0.003 
 (0.43) (0.22)   (1.84)* (1.41) 
One-tier -0.968 -1.450 -1.943 0.066 
       (3.06)***     (10.05)***     (2.15)** (0.51) 
Interaction Power distance*One-tier 0.012 0.022 0.033 0.000 
   (2.19)**   (10.10)***   (1.91)* (0.13) 
Employee protection -2.703 -2.687 -4.003 0.502 
      (4.75)***      (5.63)***       (3.34)***    (2.68)** 
Employee on board -2.623 -2.075 -7.006 0.431 
      (4.70)***     (2.47)**       (4.82)*** (1.74) 
Inter. Empl. protection* Empl. on board 3.931 3.174 9.679 -0.702 
    (4.96)***      (3.50)***      (5.28)***    (2.28)** 
Voice and accountability 0.006 1.042 -1.727 0.271 
 (0.01) (1.83)* (1.49) (1.63) 
Nr. non-executives -0.007 0.035 -0.093 0.024 
 (0.23) (1.20)     (2.42)**      (3.28)*** 
Inter.. Voice and account. * Nr. non-exec. 0.002 -0.033 0.070 -0.020 
 (0.10) (1.23)  (1.95)*       (3.33)*** 
Av stock market capitalization/ GDP  -0.146 0.078 -0.591 0.099 
 (1.57) (0.64) (1.59)    (2.15)** 
Prop. executives/ non executives -0.205 -0.225 0.082 0.000 
 (1.51) (1.09) (0.14) (0.00) 
Inter. Av. stock market/GDP *exec./non-exec. 0.144 0.165 -0.015 -0.018 
 (1.52) (1.08) (0.04) (0.25) 
Sales 0.282 0.250 0.300 -0.011 
      (3.84)***     (6.85)***      (3.69)*** (0.76) 
Return on equity -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.08) (0.98) (0.22) (0.48) 
Average GDP  0.055 -0.033 0.246 -0.015 
 (0.76) (0.45) (1.65) (0.70) 
Corporate tax  0.025 -0.000 -0.016 -0.006 
 (1.22) (0.02) (0.38) (0.91) 
Income tax 0.008 0.018 0.037 0.000 
 (0.69) (1.45)   (1.86)* (0.05) 
Constant 8.437 10.320 4.055 0.720 
     (3.82)***      (4.71)*** (0.90) (1.04) 
Observations 666 596 534 550 
R-squared 0.47 0.36 0.49 0.30 
Nr. Clusters 15 15 15 15 
A. * significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% . 
B. White robust t statistics in parentheses 
C. Industry dummies not reported 
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6.2 Results full models of firm-level main effects 
In line with previous research results (Boyd, 1994; Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 
1999; Westphal and Zajac, 1995), CEO duality seems to adequately capture 
executives’ power in relation to setting pay levels and structures. The ‘duality effect’ 
can be noted for both CEOs (models 9, 10, and 11) and average executives (models 
14 and 16). This evidence supports hypotheses 1a and 1b that CEO duality increases 
pay levels and decreases relative pay that is mend to be contingent on performance. 
However, duality did not exert a significant influence on CEO salary over total cash 
and on average executives’ total cash and bonus, suggesting that duality is more 
beneficial for the CEO him- or herself in setting pay levels than for the group of 
executive board members in its entirety. Thereby, it seems that CEO duality provides 
executives and to a lesser extend CEOs with discretion to make their pay less 
contingent on performance, as in model 16 CEO duality is significant and in model 12 
it is not.  
No significant effects on CEO pay were noted for one-tiered board structures. For 
average executive pay, however, the results on all pay level variables turned out 
significant (models 13, 14, and 15). Surprisingly, however, the effects were opposite 
from what was predicted, indicating that average executives have more discretion to 
set their own pay in a two-tiered than in a one-tiered board structure, thus 
disconfirming hypotheses 2a and 2b. A possible explanation for this effect is that two-
tier jurisdictions – especially true for Germany and the Netherlands – could also be  
staunchly managerialist in orientation (Kraakman et al., 2004). The legal principle of 
codetermination tends to result in a deadlock in the supervisory board between 
employees and shareholders, creating a power vacuum which is filled by management 
(Pistor, 1999). In the words of Kraakman and his colleagues: “in both Germany and 
the Netherlands, the single most important consequence of codetermination (…) may 
be an increase in managerial discretion” (2004: 69).  
Employee representation on boards drove down pay levels. It appears to lower 
CEO bonuses (model 11) as well as average executives’ total cash, salary, and bonus 
(models 13, 14, and 15), providing support for hypothesis 3a. No support for 
hypothesis 3b was found, as employee representation did not appear to affect the 
proportion of salary over total cash. An explanation of these findings could be that 
employee directors are more concerned with aspects of executive pay packages that 
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matter to them as employees (i.e., an equitable difference between executive and 
worker levels of pay, especially in the case of the level of cash bonuses; cf. Simon, 
1957) than with defending the interests of shareholders (for whom the performance 
sensitivity of pay might be more important than the absolute level of pay). Employees 
are in the hierarchical structure closer to the executives than to the CEO. Possibly 
employees are more concerned with the pay setting processes of more close, less 
senior, parties than in determining CEO total cash and salary. 
The effect of the absolute number of non-executives on executive pay was 
modest. The only pay level variable that was significantly affected was average 
executives’ bonus (model 15), thus offering rather weak support at best for 
Hypothesis 4a. In contrast, the coefficients for both pay structure variables (models 12 
and 16) were significant but, alas, opposite to the hypothesized direction. It seems that 
adding more non-executives to the board does not make pay more performance-
sensitive but less so, thereby disconfirming Hypothesis 4b. These results could 
indicate that the concept of “overt monitoring” (providing too much incentives in 
combination with increased monitoring) (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994) is supported 
as more non-executives show to be related with more focus on salary. However, more 
non-executives do not seem to lead to lower pay levels in general. Another 
explanation could be that bigger boards leave CEOs and executives with more 
discretion in determining performance contingent pay. The non-executives could be 
less concerned with incentive alignment arguments instead of pay levels, supporting 
the notion that non-executives only play to a certain extend a role in safeguarding firm 
interests by (all be it with weak evidence) limiting executive discretion over 
observable pay levels but not in making pay potentially more contingent on 
performance. It seems that there is a certain trade-off between agreeing on lower pay 
levels and making pay less sensitive to potential risks. Bigger boards may have no or 
decreasing effects in constraining executive discretion in determining pay levels as 
only one negative significant effect was found. Expanding the number of non-
executives possibly could also lead to the point that the board becomes unwieldy 
(Yermack, 1996). Prior research seems to confirm this conjecture, as managerialist 
countries like Germany and Japan tend to have the largest boards with the greatest 
number of outsiders (Kraakman et al., 2004; Miwa and Ramseyer, 2005). It seems 
that, rather than completely limiting managerial discretion, large boards with 
numerous non-executives could offer executives better opportunities to influence pay 
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that is potentially contingent on performance and with less or no discretion over pay 
levels.   
The ratio of executives to non-executives seem to further strengthen the notion 
that executives and especially CEOs have more discretion in determining their pay 
that is potentially contingent on performance than discretion over their pay levels. A 
higher proportion of executives over non executives skims off CEO salary and bonus 
levels (models 10 and 11). Average executive pay levels were however unaffected. 
Model 12, CEO salary over total cash, shows a significant positive effect, suggesting 
that CEOs have discretion over their pay structure by making it potentially less 
contingent on performance if the number of executives over non-executives increases. 
For CEOs it seems to be the case that more executives relative to non-executives 
limits CEO discretion over his pay levels, but not so over his discretion over pay that 
is contingent on performance. It could be that having relative less non-executives 
makes these non-executives more aware of having an important “altruistic” role in 
setting executive pay. Possible negative reputation or public outcry effects (Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2004) for non-executives of setting to high observable pay levels could 
make them exercise their role to set lower pay levels. The “overt monitoring” 
argument of less performance contingent pay seems to be supported as relative more 
non-executives were found to have still positive effects on the importance of salary as 
a proportion of total cash but have decreasing effects if the proportion is a smaller 
number (i.e. it is a ratio of executives over non-executives; more non-executives and 
the same number of executives lead to smaller negative effects for pay levels and less 
positive effects for salary over bonus). Non-executive seem not to be able to 
completely limit CEO discretion but are able to limit executive discretion. Possibly, 
CEOs could use their discretion to accept lower pay levels but negotiate that their pay 
is then made less contingent on performance.  
 
In general two explanations seem possible of the results. Firs, closer monitoring, 
either by a one-tiered board structure, by employee representation or by more non-
executives, either as a proportion of executives or as absolute numbers, seem to 
constrain executives and CEOs discretion over pay levels. Closer monitoring could 
lower the need of incentive pay, i.e. a relative lower proportion of salary of total pay. 
This would support the concept of vigilance boards not to apply overt monitoring by 
providing to much incentive pay as a proportion of total pay (cf. Finkelstein and 
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D’Aveni, 1994). Second, closer monitoring, also by relative less non-executives 
relative to more executives, lowers executive and CEO discretion of observable pay 
levels possibly in the wake of reputation or public outcry effects hampering non-
executives (cf. Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Executives and CEOs, possibly also 
constrained by these outrage effects could negotiate a trade-off between on the one 
hand lower pay levels and on the other more salary as a proportion of total pay, 
making their pay a-priory less sensitive to performance outcomes. However, as the 
first explanation seems to rely more on the altruistic role of non-executives, a 
conceptual problem within a  managerial power theory , the second explanation seem 
to be more fitting. A strengthening argument of managerial power theory, and thus for 
the second explanation, is that the results of the relationship with CEO duality and 
pay indicates considerable discretion over pay levels, especially for CEOs themselves, 
and, all be it to a lesser extend, over pay structures.     
  
6.3 Results full model and country-level main effects 
Better protection against self-dealing has a negative effect on pay levels. It lowers 
CEO bonuses (model 11), as well as average executives’ total cash and bonuses 
(models 13 and 15), thereby offering support for Hypothesis 6a. Again there seems to 
be some kind of trade-off between pay levels and pay contingent on performance. 
Models 12 and 16 have an opposite sign as hypothesized. Increased protection against 
self-dealing instead of limiting discretion by making pay potentially more contingent 
on performance, the results showed that increased protection result in more 
importance of salary as a proportion of total cash for as well CEOs as executives. It 
seems that the acceptation of lower pay levels is a trade-off with making pay less 
contingent on performance.       
No support was found for Hypotheses 7a and 7b. In contrast with an earlier study 
by Tosi and Greckhamer (2004), the cultural dimension of power distance was here 
found to have a negative effect on CEO salary (model 10) and average executives’ 
bonus (model 15), and no effects on pay structures were found. A possible reason for 
these inconsistent findings is that whereas Tosi and Greckhamer use cumulated data 
(pay averages per country), the data used here is disaggregated firm data. The latter 
allows to control for known pay determinants like firm size and performance and uses 
known within country variance of pay, something which is impossible to do with 
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aggregated data. In other words, Tosi and Greckhamer’s findings could possibly be 
the result of model misspecification (i.e., the omission of known determinants of pay) 
and neglect within country variance and possible interaction effects between firm 
level corporate governance mechanisms and culture. As Tosi and Greckhamer (2004) 
already indicate and is apparently the case: “ we [i.e. Tosi and Greckhamner] cannot 
rule out the possibility that within-country distributions of countries with similar 
mean levels of CEO pay could be markedly different” (Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004: p 
668).  
The results indicate support for hypotheses 8a. In countries where employees are 
well-protected by relevant legislation (Botero et al., 2004), they appear to be able to 
more effectively challenge executive pay levels that are disproportional to their own. 
Better employee protection drives down CEO bonus levels (model 11) as well as 
average executives’ total cash, salary, and bonus (models 13, 14, and 15). However 
hypotheses 8b is disconfirmed. Both CEO and executive salary over total cash 
(models 12 and 16) showed positive effects, implying that higher protection of 
employees result in higher importance of fixed pay. Conceptually problematic is the 
explanation that employees are reluctant to use overt monitoring by increasing 
performance contingent pay. More inline with managerial power theory is to argue 
that executives and CEOs are willing to accept lower pay levels in exchange of less a-
priory performance contingent pay.   
Mixed results were recorded for hypotheses 9a. In countries with free news media 
and stronger standards of institutional accountability CEO bonuses (model 11) were 
lower, but executives’ salaries (model 14) were higher. Hypotheses 9b was 
disconfirmed. CEOs have higher proportions of salary over total cash (model 12) in 
countries with higher levels of voice and accountability. The effectiveness of the 
“outrage” mechanism (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; 2004; 2006; Bebchuk, Fried, and 
Walker, 2002) and the level of voice and accountability in a given jurisdiction 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2005) seem to be different for executives as for 
CEOs.  
Some support for Hypotheses 10a can be reported. In countries with relative larger 
stock markets as a proportion of a country’ s economy– in which financial institutions 
tend to be better developed (Levine, 1997) and in which financial analysts and 
intermediaries occupy stronger positions (Khanna and Palepu, 2001) – executive pay 
packages appear to be scrutinized more heavily. Interestingly, financial actors appear 
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to be more concerned with CEO pay levels than with average executive pay, as 
indicated by lower CEO salary and bonus (models 9 and 11). Apparently, CEOs are 
not just figureheads (Ungson and Steers, 1984) in the eyes of the general public, but 
also individuals whom are better able than others to attract financial analysts’ and 
other intermediaries’ attention. For both CEOs and average executives alike, however, 
larger stock markets as a proportion of a country’s economy, indicative of higher 
standards of financial institutions, seem to put less bounds on the ability to make pay 
a-priory more contingent on performance (models 12 and 16).  
 
6.4 Overall results of the full model and country-firm interaction effects 
The interaction effects of protection against self-dealing (hypotheses 6c and 6d)  
on pay levels and pay structures show that the relationships between CEO duality and 
pay in countries with higher protection against self-dealing are stronger (models 
9,10,11,14 and 16). Executives’ ability to exploit the surplus power that comes with 
duality appears to be restricted significantly by better anti-self-dealing protection. 
This mostly affects the CEO/Chairs themselves, as indicated by the lower levels for 
total cash, salary, and bonus for CEOs (models 9, 10, and 11). Nonetheless, average 
executives’ salaries are also negatively affected (model 14) and the security of their 
pay diminishes (model 16). The combination of duality and good anti-self-dealing 
protection is common in jurisdictions that have their legal origins in the U.K., like the 
U.S. (Becht, 2001), Canada, Australia, and of course the U.K. itself (Conyon and 
Peck, 1998; Goergen and Renneboog, 2001a; 2001b). Overall, CEO duality by itself 
increases pay levels and result in a focus on salary. Increased protection against self-
dealing diminishes executive and CEO discretion. The combined effect of CEO 
duality and increased protection result in higher pay levels for CEOs and a focus on 
salary. For executives the combined effects result in lower total cash and bonus levels, 
but higher salary and relative higher proportions of salary over total pay.   
Strong support could also be noted for Hypothesis 7a, but not for Hypothesis 7b. 
Whereas the main effect of power distance on pay levels may have been small and, 
surprisingly, negative, this variable appears to interact strongly with one-tiered board 
structures. CEOs’ salary (model 10) and average executives’ total cash, salary, and 
bonus (models 13, 14, and 15 ) were all significantly higher when the additional 
power executives hold in a one-tiered board went unchecked by fellow-elite directors. 
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Apparently, directors on one-tier boards in high power distance countries see 
themselves more as peers to executives than as guardians of shareholders’ interests, as 
is typical in insider-controlled systems (Franks and Mayer, 1995). The governance 
landscapes of France (Bloch and Kremp, 2001) and Belgium (Becht, Chapelle, and 
Renneboog, 2001) provide cases in point of one-tier/high power distance 
combination. As stated, no significant effects of the present interaction term on pay 
structures were found. Overall two-tiered board structures seem to have higher 
average executive pay levels. Firms in countries with higher social acceptance of 
power distance however mediate these effects. Firms with one-tiered board structures 
in countries with higher acceptance of power distance positively influence pay levels.   
Surprising results were noted for Hypothesis 8c and 8d. In combination with high 
levels of legal protection for employees, the representation of employees on boards 
seems to consistently yield higher bonus levels for CEOs (model 11) as well as higher 
total cash, salary, and bonus levels for average executives (models 13, 14, and 15). 
For average executives, the salary component of their pay packages also decreased 
(model 16). These findings seem to be consistent with recent work by Pagano and 
Volpin (2005), who argue that in ‘corporatist’ countries managers and employees can 
strike a political agreement by which attention to the interests of shareholders is 
traded off against high employment protection. Examples of countries in which the 
‘corporatist’ mixture of employee codetermination, high employee protection, and 
high managerial discretion flourishes are Sweden (Agnblad, Berglöf, Högfeldt, and 
Svancar, 2001), Germany (Becht and Böhmer, 2001), and France (Bloch and Kremp, 
2001). Overall, the results indicate that employees on boards limit executive 
discretion. Protection of employees further limit executive discretion, but having 
employees on the board that are well protected increases pay levels. Having no 
employees on the board but having employees that are well protected indicate a trade-
off of lowering pay levels and increasing less pay at potential risk by increased 
proportion of salary over total cash. Having employees on the board significantly 
decreases this positive effect for executives but not for CEOs. Apparently, well 
protected employees constrain executive discretion more than they constrain CEOs. 
CEOs have lower bonuses but are left with enough discretion to have less pay that is 
contingent on performance, with or without employees on the board. It seems that the 
protection of labor is of more importance to constrain managerial discretion over pay 
levels than having employees on the board. Having employees on the board however 
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constrain executives but not CEOs in their discretion over pay that is made contingent 
on performance.   
The results for the voice and accountability variables are mixed. Higher standards 
of voice and accountability by it self has negative effects on CEO bonus levels (model 
11) and positive effects on executive salary levels. More non-executives by it self 
have only minor effects as the only significant effect is found to negatively influence 
executive bonuses (model 15). The interaction term is found to be positive for CEO 
salary (model 10 ) and executive bonuses (model 15). Overall, it seems that in 
countries characterized by higher standards of voice and accountability and with 
higher number of non-executives seem to have higher salary levels for CEOs (model 
10) and executives (model 14) but lower bonuses for CEOs (model 11) and executives 
(model 15). As for the proportion of salary of total cash, higher standards of voice and 
accountability and more non executives overall result in higher proportions of salary 
for  CEOs and executives. Apparently the mechanism of “public outcry” (Bebchuk 
and Fried 2004) and institutional voice and accountability mediates the effects of 
more or less board monitoring. Although the evidence is relatively weak, the overall 
relationships seem to indicate that more non-executives and higher standards of voice 
and accountability leave executives and CEOs with less discretion over bonus levels, 
but with discretion to increase salary and importance of salary as a proportion of total 
cash. Apparently, the unwieldiness of larger boards makes it easier for executives to 
negotiate higher salary and less pay related to performance. But when countries have 
strong informational regimes, non-executive directors ought to be disproportionately 
concerned about their image as guardians of the firms’ and financial interests in the 
narrow sense or of social efficacy more broadly. Thus, they could be more likely to 
sign off on pay packages that are “disguised” as pay-for-performance arrangements (a 
form of “stealth compensation;” cf. Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004). The results seem 
to indicate that pay packages in such jurisdictions tend to involve lower bonus levels 
(models 11 and 15) and higher fixed salary (10 an 14) and more importance of salary 
as proportion of total cash (12 and 16). Possibly, executives and CEOs are able to 
agree on lower bonus levels as a reflection of possible moderate observable firm 
performance, but use this as a trade-off to negotiate increases in salary and importance 
of salary as a proportion of total pay.   
Interesting results can be noted for Hypotheses 10c and 10d. It seems again 
evident that financial analysts and intermediaries are more concerned with the 
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discretion of CEOs than with executives. No significant results at all were noted for 
average executives, but the combination of larger stock markets and a greater 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board apparently positively mediates 
CEO salary and bonus (models 10 and 11) and made CEO-pay more dependent on 
incidental pay (model 12). Overall the results show that firms with more executives as 
a proportion of non-executives in countries with larger stock-markets as proportion of 
their economy have lower CEO pay levels, and higher proportions of salary over total 
cash for both CEOs as executives. The interaction between the proportion of 
executives and importance of the stock market positively influence CEO pay levels 
but negatively influence the proportion of salary for CEOs. Apparently, although 
relative more executives over non-executives by it self are able to limit discretion 
over pay levels and the importance of the stock market by it self has a similar effect, 
the interaction between the two is positive for pay levels, indicating more discretion, 
and is  negative for salary over total cash, indicative of less discretion. Apparently, the 
internal control mechanism as the proportion of executives over non-executive board 
members and the external control mechanisms as the importance of financial 
institutions for a countries economy do not operate better in tandem in regard of pay 
levels. Possibly, increasing the number of non-executives as representatives of 
shareholders (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998) could become of more importance when 
stock markets are of more importance. Increasing the number of non-executives 
relative to the number of executives could however lead to collective action problems 
and provide executives with more instead of less discretion (cf. Conyon and Peck 
1998, Yermack, 1996) over pay levels. However, it could increase the importance of 
(observable stock market) performance contingent pay. Implying less support for 
overt monitoring arguments as the financial markets provide also a monitoring role. 
This again further strengthens a trade-off between pay levels and potential pay 
contingent on performance. Jurisdictions with large stock markets and a high 
proportionality of outsiders on boards include the UK (where the best practice 
guidelines of the Cadbury and Greenbury reports have caused a steady increase in the 
proportion of non-executive directors on boards; cf. Conyon and Peck, 1998) and the 
US (where most companies have had a majority of nominally independent directors 
since the 1970s; cf. Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991). 
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6.5 Results full model robustness checks 
Tables 13 and 14 below report the results of the full models with only 
observations of the sup-sample using only 2003 observations. The results further 
supports the overall conclusions of the full sample. Most of the significant results that 
are found with the full sample are also found with the 2003 sample. Some extra 
significant results can however also be reported. In the models 21, 23 and 24, the 
overall results of the voice and accountability variables and the number of executives 
and the interaction variables further supports the notion that higher institutional 
standards of voice and accountability and more non executives lowers executives 
discretion over pay levels but increases discretion over pay structures. Further 
strengthening the conception that executives can use their discretion to trade-off pay 
levels with pay that is potentially more contingent on performance. Similarly, the 
importance of the stock market for a country’s economy limits executive discretion 
over pay levels but not over pay structures (models 19, 21, 23 and 24). The overall 
effects of the proportion of executives over non executives and the importance of 
stock markets show that more executives over non executives in countries with 
relative bigger stock markets have lower pay levels for CEOs and executives but have 
executives with higher proportions of salary. These results further strengthen earlier 
reported results that a) more executives over non-executives could indicate that 
relative lesser non-executives are more inclined to pay lower pay levels possibly as a 
result of reputation or outcry effects as individual non-executives are more in the 
center of attention then when more non-executives are on a board, b) executives are 
able to trade-off implications of pay contingent on performance with implications of 
pay levels, and c) more non-executives and monitoring by financial markets seem not 
to support overt monitoring arguments.  
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Table 13 
CEO pay 2003 sample full models A, B, C  
OLS regression results with country clusters 
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 
 CEO 
Total cash 
CEO 
Salary 
CEO 
Bonus 
CEO Salary / 
Total cash 
Self-dealing -0.071 0.059 -0.113 0.036 
 (0.80) (0.72) (0.69) (1.80)* 
CEO duality 1.848 1.234 1.005 0.018 
 (2.27)** (2.22)** (2.46)** (0.11) 
Interaction Self-dealing*CEO duality  -0.484 -0.336 -0.274 -0.009 
 (2.09)* (2.12)** (2.28)** (0.22) 
Power distance -0.021 -0.021 -0.009 0.001 
 (2.34)** (2.80)** (0.66) (0.23) 
One-tier -0.151 -0.583 -0.374 0.156 
 (0.31) (1.46) (0.69) (1.27) 
Interaction Power distance*One-tier 0.005 0.016 0.009 -0.002 
 (0.53) (2.27)** (1.06) (0.58) 
Employee protection -0.666 -0.474 -2.213 0.257 
 (0.84) (0.49) (1.49) (1.31) 
Employee on board -1.431 -2.332 -5.044 0.492 
 (1.18) (2.28)** (3.69)*** (1.24) 
Inter. Empl. protection* Empl. on board 1.109 2.450 6.729 -0.738 
 (0.59) (1.63) (3.53)*** (1.44) 
Voice and accountability -0.861 0.095 -1.880 0.682 
 (0.88) (0.25) (1.76)* (3.43)*** 
Nr. non-executives 0.009 0.046 -0.004 0.040 
 (0.10) (0.99) (0.04) (1.88)* 
Inter.. Voice and account. * Nr. non-exec. 0.025 -0.015 0.000 -0.034 
 (0.36) (0.37) (0.00) (2.04)* 
Av stock market capitalization/ GDP  -0.204 -0.187 -0.855 0.053 
 (1.17) (0.84) (2.55)** (0.74) 
Prop. executives/ non executives -0.159 -0.363 -0.954 0.108 
 (0.57) (1.88)* (2.01)* (1.16) 
Inter. Av. stock market/GDP *exec./non-exec. 0.117 0.243 0.708 -0.081 
 (0.65) (1.85)* (2.52)** (1.44) 
Sales 0.215 0.265 0.260 0.019 
 (3.84)*** (8.55)*** (3.00)*** (0.95) 
Return on equity 0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.72) (0.65) (0.94) (1.15) 
CEO age 0.208 0.104 -0.073 -0.010 
 (2.14)** (1.80)* (0.32) (0.25) 
CEO age2  -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (2.04)* (1.74)* (0.40) (0.29) 
Average GDP  0.044 -0.056 0.236 -0.064 
 (0.46) (0.87) (1.61) (2.33)** 
Corporate tax  0.004 -0.016 -0.047 -0.003 
 (0.17) (1.00) (0.96) (0.33) 
Income tax 0.012 0.017 0.025 -0.001 
 (0.94) (1.10) (0.88) (0.17) 
Constant 4.989 9.282 6.511 2.051 
 (1.07) (3.50)*** (0.75) (1.23) 
Observations 252 238 191 214 
R-squared 0.60 0.57 0.57 0.36 
Nr. Clusters 17 17 17 17 
A. * significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% . 
B. White robust t statistics in parentheses 
C. Industry dummies not reported 
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Table 14 
Average executive pay 2003 sample full models A, B, C 
OLS regression results with country clusters 
 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 
 Executive 
Total cash 
Executive 
Salary 
Executive 
Bonus 
Executive 
Salary / Total 
cash 
Self-dealing -0.140 -0.030 -0.036 0.022 
 (1.96)* (0.55) (0.62) (1.62) 
CEO duality 1.010 1.810 2.723 0.053 
 (1.40) (2.38)** (2.81)** (0.29) 
Interaction Self-dealing*CEO duality  -0.293 -0.555 -0.680 -0.020 
 (1.45) (2.65)** (2.49)** (0.37) 
Power distance -0.014 -0.024 -0.073 0.005 
 (2.17)** (4.07)*** (7.59)*** (2.80)** 
One-tier -0.876 -1.771 -2.329 0.071 
 (2.00)* (6.43)*** (3.36)*** (0.68) 
Interaction Power distance*One-tier 0.009 0.028 0.043 -0.001 
 (0.85) (3.99)*** (2.96)** (0.30) 
Employee protection -2.683 -2.744 -2.309 0.172 
 (4.36)*** (7.16)*** (2.32)** (1.20) 
Employee on board -3.394 -4.622 -11.705 0.982 
 (4.35)*** (6.47)*** (10.77)*** (4.98)*** 
Inter. Empl. protection* Empl. on board 5.065 6.440 15.428 -1.478 
 (4.71)*** (8.96)*** (13.76)*** (7.05)*** 
Voice and accountability -1.008 0.467 -4.612 0.620 
 (2.05)* (0.93) (4.96)*** (3.10)*** 
Nr. non-executives -0.044 0.043 -0.125 0.024 
 (1.04) (1.39) (2.07)* (1.54) 
Inter.. Voice and account. * Nr. non-exec. 0.026 -0.031 0.075 -0.014 
 (0.91) (1.31) (1.52) (1.05) 
Av stock market capitalization/ GDP  -0.231 -0.077 -1.363 0.211 
 (2.91)** (0.65) (4.63)*** (3.72)*** 
Prop. executives/ non executives -0.159 -0.608 -0.575 0.119 
 (0.48) (2.63)** (1.06) (0.90) 
Inter. Av. stock market/GDP *exec./non-exec. 0.130 0.431 0.445 -0.091 
 (0.73) (2.80)** (1.09) (0.98) 
Sales 0.349 0.288 0.471 -0.038 
 (6.48)*** (6.62)*** (3.63)*** (1.66) 
Return on equity -0.001 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 
 (0.36) (0.12) (0.57) (0.49) 
Average GDP  0.019 -0.062 0.353 -0.033 
 (0.27) (0.99) (2.92)** (1.62) 
Corporate tax  0.020 -0.006 -0.082 -0.004 
 (0.93) (0.25) (2.18)** (0.52) 
Income tax 0.003 0.024 0.050 0.003 
 (0.23) (2.28)** (3.06)*** (1.00) 
Constant 11.002 12.705 3.354 1.068 
 (4.67)*** (7.81)*** (0.99) (1.59) 
Observations 297 257 237 243 
R-squared 0.61 0.54 0.59 0.43 
Nr. Clusters 15 15 15 15 
A. * significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% . 
B. White robust t statistics in parentheses 
C. Industry dummies not reported 
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7 Discussion and Conclusion  
The objectives of this study were twofold. First, to examine the cross-national 
generalizability of managerial power theory by testing it on a sample of 940 firm-year 
observations from 17 countries. Second, to extend managerial power theory existing 
scope by assessing the influence of national context – especially that of designated 
background institutions – on the effectiveness of selected governance mechanisms for 
constraining executive discretion over their pay levels and structures. The results of 
this study speak to the current debate in the executive pay literature on the role of 
managerial power, and have several implications for management practice and policy 
makers. 
 
7.1 Generalizing managerial power theory 
The results of this study suggest that managerial power theory can be generalized 
outside of the national context in which it was formulated (i.e., the US; cf. Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2003, 2004) – but with caution. At a somewhat elevated level of 
abstraction, issues of managerial power and managerial control over the pay setting 
process are shown to also apply to other jurisdictions than the US alone. More 
concretely, the workings of certain corporate governance mechanisms appear to be 
generalizable across nations. CEO duality, for example, presents many US CEOs with 
extra discretionary powers, and therefore tends to be associated with higher pay 
(Boyd, 1994; Main and Johnston, 1993; Westphal and Zajac, 1995). The current study 
shows that duality is endemic not only in the US, but also in France – where 
individuals in the uniquely powerful role of president directeur-général can domineer 
the other directors on the board and may even have the informal power to handpick 
them (Wymeersch, 1998) – as well as in Canada, Hong Kong, and Spain. In all these 
nations, chief executives whom are also chair of the board seem to stand to reap the 
gains of surplus power. Furthermore, higher proportions of non-executive directors 
seem to not able to tame executive discretion over pay structures because of 
managerial discretion in negotiating trade-offs between implications of pay levels and 
pay structures,  not only in the US, but also in other jurisdictions with relative more 
executives over non-executive like Sweden, South Africa, and Switzerland. In sum, 
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some of the predictions derived from managerial power theory hold equally well in 
other corporate governance contexts than the US. 
Other predictions can only be generalized with greater care, however. Employee 
representation on the board for instance may work as an additional check on 
management in “outsider systems” (Franks and Mayer, 1995) like the US and the UK, 
in which ownership is dispersed and in which the principal controls on managerial 
discretion, such as the market for corporate control, supposedly are external to the 
company (Walsh and Seward, 1990). In “insider systems” (Franks and Mayer, 1995) 
like Germany (Becht and Böhmer, 2001) and Sweden (Agnblad, Berglöf, Högfeldt, 
and Svancar, 2001), however, in which ownership is more concentrated and control 
ought to come more “from within,” employees and managers may strike up a coalition 
against shareholders (Pagano and Volpin, 2005), such that employee representation 
simultaneously furthers employee protection and managerial discretion, at the expense 
of the owners of the corporation. These results should however not be seen as 
evidence against managerial power theory, as they merely specify additional 
circumstances under which managers can use their discretionary powers. They do call 
for further research, however, to map with greater precision which conditional 
varieties of national contexts increase or decrease managerial discretion. 
 
7.2 Extending managerial power theory 
The current paper offered and tested an extension of managerial power theory, 
based on the increasingly important notion that corporate governance mechanisms are 
critically affected by institutional context (Becht and Mayer, 2001; Dyck and 
Zingales, 2004; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; Roe, 2003). 
In such an approach, the contextual embedded processes of setting pay rather than 
considering pay as an instrument within these processes are of importance. The 
central theoretical tenet was that the effectiveness of a given firm-level governance 
mechanism for controlling managerial discretion would be contingent on the quality 
and makeup of the background institutions of the country in which that mechanism is 
employed. Expected was that strong and functionally complementary institutions 
would increase control over managerial behavior and decrease managerial discretion 
over their pay setting process, and weak or dysfunctional institutions would decrease 
control and increase managerial discretion.  
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Results showed however to be mixed. Some well and strong functioning 
institutions are found to mediate the expected relationships where others are found to 
negatively influence the expected effects. For instance, CEO duality allows executives 
to extract greater rents from the corporation in countries offering relatively weak 
protection against managerial self-dealing like the US (cf. Djankov et al., 2005), but 
this particular governance dysfunctionality is rendered less harmless when adequate 
investor protection laws are put in place. Furthermore, in contrast with earlier findings 
(Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004), little support was found for a main effect of the cultural 
dimension of power distance on executive pay. What is found however, is that this 
dimension enlarges managerial power in situations where control is supposed to 
emanate from direct peers, such as in a one-tiered board structure. Here, the respect 
for fellow elite members that is typical of high power distance countries (cf. Hofstede, 
2001) diminishes non-executives’ willingness to police executives.  
On the other hand, higher levels of institutionalized protection of labor and 
employees representatives jointly increase managerial discretion. Although the 
separate effects of these variables showed to dampen managerial power over pay 
levels, their interaction effect positively relates to pay levels. Similarly, the mediation 
between bigger stock markets and relative more executives over non-executives 
resulted in counter intuitive results. Although the separate effects of these two showed 
to be negatively related to pay levels, their interaction effect is positive.     
The results in general show the contextual importance of firm level corporate 
governance mechanisms. Further research is however needed to further comprehend 
the complex interaction effects between background institutions and corporate 
governance mechanisms. The many possible combinations between background 
institutions and the many different corporate governance mechanisms may be 
complemented with extensive studies that systemically asses possible combinations 
and their effects on pay levels and structures. Furthermore, an other technique of Set-
theoretic Methods, a method that can be used to examine which combinations of 
attributes lead to specific outcomes, could be used as a complementary method to 
investigate the contextual makeup and relationships with corporate governance 
mechanisms and their joint effects on executive pay.  
More research is also needed to address the issue to which extent non-executives 
use their discretion to on one hand set their own pay and to set the pay of executives. 
The focus in the current paper has been on executives, future research could further 
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explore the implications of an institutional managerial power theory and the context in 
which non-executive pay is set and how non-executives use their discretion to collude 
with executives. Investigating the implications of non-executive discretion could 
further shed light on managerial power theory’s indicated conceptual concerns of non-
executive altruistic roles and concepts of overt monitoring.    
An other issue is the extent to which managerial discretion leads to “bad” or 
“good” behavior. For instance the result that in a two-tiered system executives seem 
to have more discretion is arguably an indication that they have simply more 
responsibilities and decision making freedom over firm resources and organizational 
slack (cf. Cyert and March, 1992). The conceptual fundamental difference between 
(mis-)using discretion for pure and only opportunistic behavior, or using it for 
organizational interests or self-interests with inclined cooperation (Gomez-Mejia, 
Wiseman and Dykes 2005, Murphy 2002, Roe, 2003) needs additional research. In 
contrast to the present study, the view in the executive pay literature typically is 
normative in the sense that discretion is mostly understood as having negative results 
for shareholder value (e.g. in the mainstream literature that adheres solely to the 
contract approach of agency theory, discretion is ruled out and is only considered as a 
cost). Executive discretion might indicate that executives are in a position to game the 
system by simply increasing their pay or to influence their pay structures, but 
discretion and related pay levels and structures arguably reflect true responsibilities 
and decision making freedom that any actor has in any social constructed system 
where market forces are limited and actors are constrained to make fully rational, 
calculated, optimal decisions (cf. Cyert and March,1992). Actors may thus be more 
inclined to follow rules of thumb and other cognitive behaviors when negotiating 
executive pay that reflect the appropriateness of certain pay given the institutional 
conditions and personal (normative) considerations in the process (cf. Cyert and 
March, 1992). A broader objective function of the firm as striving for long term firm 
value instead of the normative assumption of shareholder value (cf. Jensen, 2001) 
ought to consider the most likely possibility that discretion also has a positive 
contribution for performance. Future research is needed to make the conceptual 
(normative) difference more explicit and may show empirically how executive pay 
and discretion interact with corporate governance arrangements and institutions and 
how these relationships effect and are effected by firm performance.        
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7.3 Implications for Practice 
The results of this study have several implications for policy makers and for 
shareholders and their representatives. Policy makers – including “soft regulators” 
like stock exchanges and directors’ associations – around the globe have recently 
begun to introduce new practices in their existing corporate governance systems, 
either as a response to globalization or to systemic corporate crises in the post-Enron 
era (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Similarly, stakeholders and their 
representatives are pushing for corporate governance reforms, especially in 
jurisdictions that have suffered from prolonged periods of sub-par economic 
performance.  The current paper harbors at least three lessons for these parties. 
First, they should not try to copy elements from more successful jurisdictions (i.e., 
countries with higher economic growth rates, better average firm performance, or 
broader and deeper stock markets) directly. Especially US-style governance principles 
have long been heralded as a superior way of distributing corporate wealth and 
regulating the relations between managers and other constituents (Fiss and Zajac, 
2004). But policy makers should not turn a blind eye to the institutional idiosyncrasies 
of the US economic landscape. Especially if their own institutional makeup is 
considerably different from the US, they should not count on the possible 
effectiveness of US-style governance mechanisms, and are most likely better off 
selecting governance principles that suit their own context better. Second, if aiming to 
influence managerial discretion, firm-level governance reforms seem to work best 
when they go hand-in-hand with jurisdiction-level institutional reforms. Although 
relationships between certain institutional conditions and corporate governance 
mechanisms could negatively mediate executive discretion, this does not have to be 
true for all combinations. Some are found to increase rather than decrease managerial 
discretion. Amendments to one of the other (i.e. institutions or mechanisms) could 
therefore have less or opposite wanted effects for specific pay components and/or pay 
makeup. When challenging the discretionary powers CEO duality harbors, for 
example, policy makers should simultaneously push for better shareholder protection. 
Focusing on just one of the two is unlikely to yield satisfactory results, as illustrated 
by the differential experiences of the US and the UK in addressing discretionary 
powers of CEO-Chairmen (Conyon and Peck, 1998). And third, CEOs and executives 
seem to have discretion to make trade-offs between positive and negative effects for 
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their pay levels with negative and positive effects for their pay that is potentially more 
contingent on performance. Implying that certain reforms may limit or increase 
discretion over pay levels but may simultaneously increase or decrease discretion over 
pay that is potentially more inline with performance. 
In short, effective governance reforms are likely to be those that respect the 
uniqueness of each national system of corporate governance and that work toward the 
improvement of local governance conditions. More radical reform attempts, in which 
large parts of foreign governance systems are “transplanted” into a given national 
context without much regard for the actual mix of extant background institutions (a 
process stimulated, amongst others, by the World Bank and the OECD – two 
organizations promoting their own rather strict principles of corporate governance) 
are less likely to be successful. More research is needed, however, to come to a better 
understanding of the effects of the present “governance harmonization movement” led 
by these supranational organizations on the competitiveness of firms and regions.  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
Even though calls for more attention to the role of managerial power in the pay 
setting process are by no means new (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; 
Finkelstein and Boyd 1998, Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Grabke-Rundell and 
Gomez-Mejia, 2002; Hallock, 1997; Jensen and Murphy, 2004; Tosi and Gomez-
Mejia, 1989; Useem, 1996; Westphal and Zajac, 1995), managerial power theory (cf. 
Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004, 2006) offers an important addition to the executive 
pay literature because it is the first systematic theory of the processes by which 
executives come to set their own pay. It is systematic, first, because it offers an 
orderly account of how its own assumptions regarding the behavior of executives and 
non-executives contrast with those of the received optimal contracting approach. It is 
also systematic, second, because it brings together and integrates a substantial number 
of previously disconnected findings on various aspects of the executive pay setting 
process, such as social influencing processes on the board and the role of public 
outcry.  
In contrast to the mainstream literature, and also in contrast to the single 
institutional view taken by Bebchuk and Fried, the current paper explored the 
important implications of considering variance in institutional makeup. The paper has 
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demonstrated the generalizability of this important theory, by showing that 
managerial power influences executives’ pay levels and structures in many 
economically developed nations. It also offered a straightforward major extension of 
the theory, by demonstrating how the effectiveness of certain firm-level governance 
mechanisms is contingent upon the quality and makeup of a given nation’s 
institutional matrix. To further the development of an institutional managerial power 
theory, proposed is that future research extend this study by exploring how 
combinations of (other) governance mechanisms interact with (other) institutional 
structures to impact executives’ influence and remuneration and in finding more 
generalized explanations about the contextual context in which interactions of 
mechanisms and background institutions can positively or negatively influence 
managerial discretion and how this is influenced by and has influence on firm and a 
country’s economic performance. 
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